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ABSTRACT 
 
Diasporas are increasingly prevalent as globalization has increased transnational interaction 
between homelands and host-states.  The territorial state as a container of the nation is 
challenged by transnational interactions of diasporas, although titular nation-states continue to 
territorialize detached ethnic minority groups within homeland rhetoric.  This thesis evaluates 
diasporic identity and transnational belonging of the Koryo saram – or Koreans of the former 
Soviet Union – to explore how South Korea utilizes its assumed role as ethnic homeland to 
expand its economic influence in Central Asia.  During the Joseon period (1392-1910) northern 
Koreans experienced socio-cultural marginalization that encouraged migration to the Russian Far 
East, and in 1937 the entire Koryo saram population of 200,000 ethnic Koreans was deported to 
Soviet Central Asia.  Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, South Korea has made significant 
efforts to reintroduce nationalized Korean culture and history in order to revitalize the 
‘Koreanness’ of the Koryo saram to expand its global economic influence and reinforce political 
legitimacy on the peninsula, but South Korean government policy does not recognize the Koryo 
saram as belonging within the Korean ethnos.  South Korean primarily maintains interactions 
with the Koryo saram to infiltrate burgeoning Central Asian economies, diversify its energy 
needs, and promote the cultural soft power of the ‘Korean wave’ (Hallyu) despite the socio-
cultural division between the “homeland” and the Koryo saram diaspora.  This separation of the 
diaspora from a collective myth of homeland and homeland return reveals the “liminal 
diasporism” of adaptive diasporas in an age of transnationalism and globalization. 
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NOTE ON KOREAN ROMANIZATION 
For transliteration of the Korean hangul script I have used the Revised Romanization of 
Korean system, rather than the more standard McCune-Reischauer Romanization system, 
because of its simplicity for both Korean and non-Korean speaking readers alike.  The Revised 
Romanization system avoids the excessive hyphens and apostrophes of which the McCune-
Reischauer system uses in excess. 
 Korean names are written with the surname preceding the given name.  I have followed 
this practice with historical figures (e.g., Sin Chae’ho) throughout the text, excusing commonly 
referenced names (e.g., Syngman Rhee).  To avoid confusion I have also cited Korean authors 
with given names first, followed by the surname (e.g., Chong Jin Oh, rather than Oh Chong Jin). 
 While the Revised Romanization system eliminates diacritics and adheres to Korean 
phonology more closely than the McCune-Reischauer system, it should be noted that while the 
Revised system refers to the ancient Korean kingdom of ‘Goryeo’, in the McCune-Reischauer 
system the same kingdom is rendered as ‘Koryŏ’ – the root derivative of the Koryo saram. 
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SEMANTIC EXPLANATION OF THE KORYO SARAM 
The Koryo saram are one of the largest groups within the claimed Korean diaspora 
community. The term “Koryo saram” literally means “person of Goryeo.”  During Korea’s Three 
Kingdoms Period (57–668 CE) the largest, northernmost kingdom on the peninsula was 
Goguryeo.  During the Unified Silla period (668-935 CE), the Korean kingdom of Balhae (698–
926 CE) was established within former Goguryeo territory.  Throughout its history, Balhae was 
referred to by neighboring tribes and Chinese kingdoms as Goryeo (a derivative of Goguryeo) 
(Kim 2011).  After the fall of Unified Silla, the subsequent rulers resurrected the name of Goryeo, 
and the kingdom lasted from 918–1392 – before it was supplanted by the Joseon rulers of the Yi 
dynasty (1392–1910).  The English name “Korea” is derived from the term Goryeo and the 
modern-day states of North Korea and South Korea are officially the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK), respectively.  In Korean the name 
of South Korea (Daehan Minguk) translates to “Nation of the Great Han,” while North Korea has 
revived the name of Joseon (Joseon Minjujueu Inmin Gonghwa-guk or Joseon People’s 
Democratic Republic).  Although both countries claim to be the Korean “homeland,” neither title 
designates a place for the “people of Goryeo,” the Koryo saram. 
Central Asian Koreans refer to themselves as the Koryo saram, while South Korean 
political and academic discourse refers to Central Asian Koreans as Koryo-in.  German Kim and 
Ross King (2001) explain the usage of ‘saram’ in Koryo-mal (a dialect of Korean spoke by the 
Koryo saram) as more linguistically productive than the modern Korean term ‘in’.  Although 
literal meanings of ‘saram’ (native Korean) and ‘in’ (Sino-Korean) are synonymous, general 
usage specifies ‘saram’ as an individual, while ‘in’ refers to a more collective or group identifier.  
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In this context even the semantic distinctions between Central Asian Korean and South Korean 
terminology designates that South Koreans separate the Koryo saram as a distinct ethnic group. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Embedded within global processes de/re-territorialization is a realignment of identity 
among diaspora communities.  Currently the term “diaspora” is used to reference any group of 
migrants beyond the political borders of their respective nation-state.  Understanding diasporic 
identity of transnational groups is vital to recognizing the role of diasporas as intermediaries 
between historic homelands and current states of residence.  My thesis explores the diasporic 
identity of the Central Asian Korean diaspora, known as the Koryo saram, to explore the 
question: How does South Korea utilize its assumed role as homeland of the Koryo saram 
diaspora to expand its economic influence in Central Asia?  Employing geographic and diaspora 
theories, I analyze South Korea’s perspectives on ethnic Koreans residing in former Soviet 
Central Asia and its role as historic and ethnic homeland. 
Chapter 2 situates the Koryo saram within theories of diasporic identity, ethnicity, and 
territorial belonging.  This chapter highlights the standard works on diasporas by Safran (1991), 
Clifford (1994), Tololyan (1995), and Cohen (1996), as well as more contemporary works by 
Brubaker (2005), Shuval (2000), and Brinkerhoff (2009) to discuss the validity of the Koryo 
saram as a diaspora.  Issues of identity surrounding detached ethnic groups compel questions 
pertaining to the constructed links between people and place (homeland conceptions). 
The fundamental principle in defining whether or not a detached group is diasporic lies 
within the dynamics of dispersal from, attachment with, and myth of eventual return to a 
homeland.  While a majority of diaspora communities can be associated with a titular nation-
state, the existence of a geopolitical entity is not a qualifying factor in identifying diasporas 
(Carter 2004; Clifford 1994; Malkki 1995).  Detached group identities are predominately based 
on the preservation, and when necessary, recovery of traditions and customs to maintain a sense 
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of attachment to the homeland, and geo-political discourse promotes a titular state as an assumed 
homeland of ethnic diaspora groups, despite constructions of imagined homelands (Blunt 2007; 
Cohen 1996).  This assumption is based on the sovereignty and power given to states within the 
nation-state system. 
A diaspora’s connection with its homeland must be strong enough to overcome host-land 
assimilation and acculturation, although globalization and information technologies are making it 
increasingly possible for diaspora groups to maintain identity beyond nation-state boundaries 
(Alonso 2006; Anderson 1991; Brinkerhoff 2009; Lie 2004).  Transnational characteristics of 
diasporas stretch beyond the relations of the detached group and their titular homeland to form 
triangular relationships between host-land, homeland, and diaspora group.  These relations 
increase transnational connections, indicating that diasporas will become powerful players in 
international politics and economics (Brubaker 2005; Butler 2001). 
A general history of the Korean peninsula during its most prominent dynastic periods in 
pre-modern and early modern history, including the Japanese occupation and post-war division, 
is discussed in Chapter 3.  While portions of this chapter may be in chronological order, the 
purpose is not to simply regurgitate historical facts, but to situate the Koryo saram within an 
historical setting to understand the ethno- and socio-cultural division that separates the Koryo 
saram from the “homeland.” 
A major focus of this chapter is the misappropriated title of “Unified Silla” in reference 
to the ancient kingdom of Silla that emerged as a major power on the peninsula during the 7th 
century, and the role of the Korean kingdom of Balhae (Ch. Bohai) in what is today North Korea, 
Manchuria, and the Russian Far East.  Over-emphasis on the unification of the peninsula by Silla 
(668-935) can be attributed to anti-colonial nationalist rhetoric to reinforce the Korean nation as 
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pre-dating the Japanese nation.  While Balhae is often obscured, it is necessary to understand its 
role in ancient Korean history in order to properly form a conception of an imagined homeland 
for the Koryo saram. 
Chapter 3 also highlights the Koryo saram within the context of peninsular Korean 
history in order to frame the contexts of implications for interaction between homeland and host-
lands, leading into the final discussion of the role of the Koryo saram diaspora on South Korean-
Central Asian relations.  The focus of Chapter 4 analyzes the perception of the Koryo saram 
within South Korean discourse and addresses the questions: Do the Koryo saram consider South 
Korea as their ethnic homeland?  What is the role of South Korea in constructing the Koryo 
saram identity?  How do South Korea’s interactions with the Koryo saram reflect the role of 
diasporas in the current and future global world?  Each of these questions leads to the conclusion 
of how South Korea utilizes its assumed role as the Koryo saram homeland to expand its global 
economic influence and reinforce political legitimacy on the Korean peninsula. 
Assuming the role of ethnic homeland, South Korean government organizations and 
businesses have exploited ethnic connections with the Koryo saram to gain access to the 
burgeoning energy economies of Central Asia.  While ties between South Korea and this 
component of its claimed diaspora community have clearly strengthened since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, interactions between the “homeland” and the Koryo saram should not be 
considered an ethnic or cultural revival, per se (Khan 2013).  Although South Korea assumes the 
role of homeland, a lack of repatriation, diminished sense of belonging, and differing ethnic 
characteristics among the Koryo saram devalue this claim. 
This thesis establishes that South Korea’s interest and involvement with the Central 
Asian Koreans is predominately economic: the “homeland” relies on Central Asian states’ 
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economies to diversify its energy needs (Calder and Kim 2009; Fumagalli 2012; Hwang 2012).  
While this issue has been addressed from a politico-economic lens, my work examines the topic 
from an ethno-cultural perspective to evaluate how South Korea utilizes its cultural soft power to 
infiltrate Central Asian economies, despite an increasing ethno-cultural division between the 
“homeland” and the Koryo saram diaspora.  South Korea maintains ties with the Central Asian 
republics under the assumed role of ethnic homeland of the Koryo saram, but innately 
designating South Korea as such ascribes to frailties of modern geopolitical dichotomies of the 
nation-state system.  Discussing identity formation of the Koryo saram may illuminate identity 
construction of adaptive diasporas, potentially creating a new category of what I refer to as 
“liminal diasporism.” 
I have applied my Korean language skills to consult South Korean government 
documents, historic texts, and public media reports relating to the Koryo saram.  These primary 
sources provided me with particular insight regarding South Korea’s assumed role as historic 
homeland and perceptions of the Koryo saram diaspora group.  With assistance from Dr. Valeriy 
S. Khan, I also conducted surveys via online questionnaires with Koryo saram diasporans in 
Uzbekistan to gather opinions regarding perception of South Korea as “homeland.”  This 
research is highlighted in Chapter 4. 
 Although the scope of this paper does not explore the interactions between the Koryo 
saram and North Korea, it is significant to note that the North Korean regime – like South Korea 
– has maintained an anti-colonial historical identity based on the turn-of-the-century nationalist 
movement (Schmid 2002).  Yet North Korea has not extensively pursued relations with the 
Koryo saram in order to limit external influence and maintain ideals of isolationism, although 
most Korean ex-patriots in Japan returned to northern Korea following the Japanese surrender 
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(Ryang 1997, 2012).  In the 1940s Stalin sent a group of ethnic Koreans from the Soviet Union 
to assist Kim Il-Sung in establishing the North Korean communist government.  Eventually, the 
Kim regime’s interpretation of communism veered from the Soviet model, and the repatriated 
Soviet Koreans were purged.  Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea 
established diplomatic and economic relations with the Central Asian republics.  During this time, 
North Korea competed with South Korea for political legitimacy via interactions with the Korean 
diaspora community, including the Koryo saram.  After significant efforts North Korea could no 
longer compete financially with South Korean efforts in constructing cultural centers, making 
investments, and conducting telecommunication broadcasts, and eventually ceased the majority 
of its interactions.1  Though North Korean ventures have fallen short of any significant impact in 
developing a sense of “homeland” among the Koryo saram, the communist state continues to 
assert this role to establish its political legitimacy on the peninsula (Kim and Khan 2001; Oh 
2007; Tae 2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 A major outreach effort is the annual “Songdowon International Children’s Camp,” during which North Korea 
hosts Koryo saram teens and young adults for a week to learn about ethnic Korean culture and experience the 
“homeland.” 
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CHAPTER 2: 
TRANSNATIONALISM AND TERRITORIALITY: DIASPORAS IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
The term ‘diaspora’, until a relatively recent expansion of usage, was a specific reference 
to the dispersion of the Jews from their inherited Holy Land (Cohen 1996; Safran 1991).  
According to Robin Cohen (1996), the original meaning of the term ‘diaspora’ referred almost 
exclusively to the forced dispersion of the Jewish community, and he argued a necessity to break 
from the purely victimized usage of the term in academia.  Accompanying global de/re-
territorialization is a “reorientation of identity” among diaspora communities (Butler 2001; 
Carter 2004; Cohen 1996; Diener 2009).  The break that Cohen (1996) desired has come to 
incorporate a multitude of peoples and nations spread across the globe, although the term 
“diaspora” is now bandied about in reference to any group that wanders beyond the political 
borders of its respective nation-state. 
Judith Shuval (2000; see also Malkki 1995) claims that diaspora is a type of migration 
that will become more commonplace in an increasingly globalized world, although she attributes 
this expansion to its newly acquired “broad semantic domain” rather than an actual increase of 
diaspora groups.  In order to properly designate the Koryo saram as a diaspora, an analysis of the 
qualifications of each detached group and the – or what they perceive to be the – homeland is 
paramount.  This chapter includes a brief history of the Koryo saram preceding an analysis of 
territory, homeland, and diaspora theory. 
Diaspora: Defining a “Travelling Term” 
A ‘diaspora’ can be defined as “the dispersal of a people from its original homeland” 
(Butler 2001, p.189).  Despite its original context, referring almost exclusively to the spread of 
Israelites from their inherited ancestral homeland, the terminology surrounding ‘diaspora’ has 
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extended its semantic reach to include immigrants, expatriates, refugees, and guest-workers 
(Brinkerhoff 2009; Brubaker 2006; Clifford 1994),but according to Kim Butler (2001, p.194), 
“diasporas have unique characteristics distinguishing them from other types of [migrant] 
communities.” 
The trouble with defining diaspora is that it is a “travelling term” (Clifford 1994, p.302).  
This phenomenon is referred to by Rogers Brubaker (2006) as “the ‘diaspora’ diaspora,”2 and 
Robin Cohen (1996, p.514) addresses the issues as the “inevitable dilution of ‘diaspora’ as a 
terminology,” albeit with the caveat that “diaspora” is used in “a variety of new, but interesting 
and suggestive contexts.”  In constructing a distinct definition of diaspora, the dynamic nature of 
identity must be considered.  Comparing case studies with an ideal type of diaspora may distract 
from the histories of certain social groups that, during certain times throughout history, have 
been subject to a “wax and wane in diasporism” (Clifford 1994, p.306).     
Regardless of the ambiguous expansion of “who” or “what” may be categorized as 
diasporic, the classic works on the subject refer to a fairly standardized set of features to define 
“diaspora.”  James Clifford (1994) argues against establishing an “ideal type” because 
comparative case studies often detract from specific histories and experiences (see also Goetze 
1998).  The discourse surrounding diaspora has expanded to “encompass a multitude of ethnic, 
religious and national communities living outside of the territory to which they are historically 
‘rooted’” (Carter 2004; Clifford 1994).  While scholars may amend, delete, or emphasize various 
portions pertaining to their specific study group, the three basic features of a diaspora include (1) 
a dispersal – traditionally forced – from an historic homeland to multiple destinations, (2) a 
constructed and maintained concept of a homeland, whether actual or imagined, and (3) a 
                                                          
2 Brubaker (2005, p.1) refers to the “‘diaspora’ diaspora” as “a dispersion of the meanings of the term in semantic, 
conceptual, and disciplinary space.” 
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conscious group identity (Butler 2001; Clifford 1994; Cohen 1996; Safran 1991).  A major 
feature amended to the traditional definition is lived experience in a host-land over multiple 
generations (Butler 2001; Clifford 1994; Cohen 1996). 3  In an effort to expand Safran’s (1991) 
six point outline of diasporic characteristics, Cohen (1996) included features that allow a more 
expansive adaptation of the terminology.  The following is a comprehensive list of Cohen’s 
(1996) nine features of diaspora: 
1. Dispersal from an original homeland, often traumatically, to two or more foreign regions, 
2. Alternatively, the expansion from a homeland in search of work, in pursuit of trade or to 
further colonial ambitions, 
3. A collective memory and myth about the homeland, including its location, history, and 
achievements, 
4. An idealization of the putative ancestral home and a collective commitment to its 
maintenance, restoration, safety and prosperity, even to its creation, 
5. The development of a return movement which gains collective approbation, 
6. A strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time and based on a sense of 
distinctiveness, a common history, and the belief in a common fate, 
7. A troubled relationship with host societies, suggesting a lack of acceptance at the least or 
the possibility that another calamity might befall the group, 
8. A sense of empathy and solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries of 
settlement, and the possibility of a distinctive yet creative and enriching life in host 
countries with a tolerance for pluralism. 
 
Despite the variable application of specific features in defining ‘diaspora’, the 
fundamental principle in defining whether a detached group is diasporic lies within the integrated 
dynamics of dispersal from, persistent attachment with, and myth of eventual return to a 
“homeland.”  Brubaker (2006) argues that in modern discourse a mere dispersion across space is 
enough to classify a population as diasporic, stretching the semantic value of the term until it has 
lost its utility in defining and distinguishing a particular phenomenon.  It is common practice for 
detached group identity to focus on historic homelands – real or imagined – as a means of 
cultivating or maintaining group cohesion (Anderson 1991; Blunt 2007; Shuval 2000). 
                                                          
3 Though he does not argue specifically that a multi-generational aspect is necessary in defining a diaspora, Clifford 
(1994) does note that a diaspora is not intended to be temporary. 
 12 
Despite the characteristics of transnationalism, diasporas continue to be defined in a 
binary relationship against the nation-state.  According to Cohen (1996, p.516), “transnational 
bonds no longer have to be cemented by migration or by exclusive territorial claims… in the age 
of cyberspace a diaspora can, to some degree, be held together or re-created through the mind, 
through cultural artefacts, and through a shared imagination” (see also Brinkerhoff 2009).  
Diasporas are both ethno-national and transnational, although transnationalism does not imply 
diasporism (Blunt 2007; Cohen 1996).  The transnational role of diaspora stretches beyond the 
relations of the dislocated group and their titular homeland to form triangular relationships 
between the assumed ethnic homeland, the diaspora group, and the host-land-turned “home” 
state.  These relations increase transnational connections and break the binary discourse 
surrounding geo-politics. 
Constructing Community, Homeland, and Return Myth 
Diasporas consist of multiple groups stemming from a single ethnic background that 
generally share a common perception of an historic homeland.  These dispersed diaspora groups 
are referred to as diaspora communities.  Brubaker (2005) makes it clear that the term 
“communities” should only be used within quotes – which may be true for almost any term used 
within the social sciences, including “diaspora.”  The insistence of quotes by Brubaker (2005) 
distinguishes the dynamic aspects of community, identity, and – by extension – diaspora 
construction.  Ana Maria Alonso (1994, p.380) argues that “by positing a mystifying separation 
of the political and the social, scholars have objectified and personified the state,” and this trend 
exists in diasporas as well.  Diaspora groups and communities are not ethnically homogenous.  
Discourse surrounding diasporas must overcome the fallacies of ethnic purity within a given 
group and homogenous cultural populations; these misconceptions establish ethnicity as 
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instinctive and primordial, but “ethnicity is invented in the course of cultural, political, and 
economic struggles” (Alonso 1994, p.392, emphasis added).  Ethnicity is therefore a functional 
attribute created as an effort to distinguish themselves from ‘others’, making ethnic distinction 
vital in maintaining a diasporic identity (Clifford 1994).  In his discussion of “otherness,” Stuart 
Hall (1993) emphasizes the heterogeneity of cultural identity within ethnic communities.  The 
Koryo saram are unlike other Koreans in linguistic, social, and cultural customs, yet are branded 
as being within the Korean diaspora community that, for the most part, did not exist until after 
the creation of the modern South Korean state in 1948. 
 “Diaspora” is not simply a label, but a symbol of historic – and present – struggles to 
establish and solidify identity (Clifford 1994).  According to David Goetze (1998, p.61), “group 
identity results from an evolved mechanism designed to propagate genes identical by common 
descent, whether those genes reside in oneself or in others.”  Goetze’s (1998, pp.60-61) study 
suggests that this “mechanism” encourages the value of kinship attachments, which in turn 
increases group attachment.  However, the power of ‘kinship’ in communities can stretch beyond 
directly shared ancestry, creating a cohesive group identity, although “one should, of course, be 
wary of projections of contemporary ethnic categories backward in time…more complex than 
such formulations imply” (Malkki 1995, p.21; see also Alonso 1994; Goetze 1998; Lie 2004).  
Like nations, diasporas perceive and construct their identity based on common history, language, 
and even past achievements of their society and culture (Shuval 2000, p. 44).   
Another key component of group identity, especially regarding diasporas, is ethnicity.  
Alonso (1994) and Butler (2001, p. 214) further emphasize that ethnicity is not only important as 
a group identifier, but is vital to status and power in state societies.  But diaspora identity 
stretches beyond the physical realm, “into the psychosocial reality of diaspora” (Butler 2001, p. 
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207).  A belief in kinship and affiliations with ethnic groups, particularly in a diaspora context, 
create ethnic boundary markers (Alonso 1994; Butler 2001; Lie 2004).  The experiences that 
form the core of diaspora identity are highly subjective to the group defining itself within its 
identified parameters (Clifford 1994).  Hall (1993) divides cultural identity into “shared culture” 
and “a matter of ‘becoming’ as well as of ‘being’.”  Shared cultural identity revolves around a 
nation’s ability to construct a common view of historical experience, in lieu of or despite actual 
history, in order to establish a unified community (ibid; Anderson 1991).  This imagined history 
is especially valuable to diasporic identity and homeland myth.  Identities are created and 
manipulated within actual and perceived histories, by those within and without, but are also 
based on the preservation and, when necessary, recovery of traditions and customs in order to 
maintain a sense of attachment to the homeland (Shuval 2000). 
Contact within diaspora communities “independent of contacts with the homeland, is 
vital in forging diaspora consciousness, institutions, and networks” (Butler 2001, p.207).  The 
identity of a diaspora group partially stems from the “self-awareness” that comes as that group 
discovers the existence of its place within the greater diaspora community, whether self-
constructed or inferred (Butler 2001).  Diaspora consciousness suggests recognition of the 
historical and cultural connection to the homeland, while it includes a simultaneous recognition 
of the unique community existing between members of the diaspora group. 
In his work on territory and human territoriality, Robert Sack (1986, p.58) notes that “the 
connection between a people and the place they occupy becomes extremely close.”  People and 
their social identity become intricately woven together with place, due to the vital connection 
between territorializing space and group formation (Alonso 1994; Lie 2004; Sack 1986).  While 
the most basic sense of place can simply refer to being in a specific location, important events 
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and places – with religious, familial, and social value – create an identity of the territory, 
intertwining the homeland and its inhabitants (Abrahams 1986; Bruner 1986; Geertz 1986; 
Kapferer 1986; Turner 1969, 1986).  Homelands play an integral role in forming diaspora 
identities; cultural and social traditions are intrinsically tied with place (Blunt 2007; Butler 2001; 
Tuan 1979).  Place, especially when it becomes a homeland, is responsible for the formation of 
group identity, although the community bestows the meaning (Sack 1986; Tuan 1979). 
Diasporas continue to be defined in a binary relationship against the Westphalian nation-
state despite transcendence of geo-political boundaries and characteristics of trans-nationalism 
(Brubaker 2005; Carter 2004; Malkki 1995).  Many groups referred to as diasporas today became 
such due to negative affiliations with the political nation-state in their homeland.  Diaspora 
discourse should not be expanded to include non-ethnic groups while excluding groups who have 
a homeland transcending geo-political borders (Butler 200196; Clifford 1994).  Current 
discourse surrounding diasporas is actually more concerned with the “conceptual homeland,” in 
part because the actual homeland may no longer exist (Brubaker 2005; Safran 1991).   
 The binding feature of all diasporas is the concept of an ethnic homeland, and the essence 
of the homeland is centered on the concept of return (Butler 2001; Safran 1991).  The homeland 
return myth is essential in the formation of diasporic identity and the diaspora experience (Butler 
2001; Safran 1991).  Clifford (1994) argues that immigrants seek to make their destination a new 
homeland, while the diaspora seeks to return to their previous homeland, or at least maintains the 
myth of return.  Whether the homeland exists in actuality or conceptuality, the homeland return 
myth is essential to diaspora identity because it “serves to solidify ethnic consciousness” (Safran 
1991, p. 91; see also Blunt 2007).  Despite technological advancements and the creation of non-
concrete bonds among diasporas and homelands, the importance of place – especially 
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‘homeland’ – is still a valuable feature in defining diaspora (Brubaker 2005; Clifford 1994; 
Cohen 1996).  Butler (2001, p.205) notes that “to some extent, diasporan representations of the 
homeland are part of the project of constructing diasporan identity, rather than homeland 
actuality.” 
The myth of a return is more fundamental to the diaspora identity than its actual 
possibility of physically returning (Butler 2001).  Although thoughts of an historic homeland are 
inherently nostalgic, they express “a stubborn hope” of eventual return (Clifford 1994).  Clifford 
(1994) describes the maintenance of a homeland return myth by a diaspora group as “lived 
tension.”  While residing in another space, the dispersed recollect and seek to return to a former 
place (Shuval 2000).  Diaspora groups seek to maintain “a collective memory, vision, or myth 
about their original homeland – its physical location, history, and achievements” (Safran 1991, 
p.83).  Ascribing to this mythological conception of a homeland allows diasporas to imagine an 
ideal homeland that current and future generations may look to in order to make the difficulties 
in life more tolerable (Safran 1991). 
According to Clifford (1994, p.319) diasporic identity is created by unequal political and 
economic regimes, although group consciousness is produced by cultures and histories in 
“collision and dialogue.”  The “collision and dialogue” of diasporas and their home-/host-land 
relationships are not extinguished after initial dispersion, and both homeland and host-land are 
primary contributors to the formation and development of diaspora consciousness and identity 
(Butler 2001).  All parts of this triangular relationship are dynamic.  A diaspora’s connection 
with a homeland must be strong enough to overcome host-land assimilation in part or in whole, 
and thus diaspora groups to maintain identity beyond the nation-state; in essence, there is a 
creation of “pluralistic nationalism” (Clifford 1994, p. 310).  Sean Carter (2004, p. 62) claims 
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that there is a “double re-territorialization” among diasporas.  This phenomenon comprises an 
effort to maintain the homeland while being “rooted (or routed) through the territory of the 
nation of residence.”  According to Carter’s (2004) “double re-territorialization,” diasporas 
remain in a liminal state, simultaneously belonging and not belonging to both the homeland and 
host-land. 
The ethnic homeland of the Koryo saram was a dynastic Korean peninsula.  Currently the 
peninsula is divided politically and culturally between North and South, and the Koryo saram 
reside predominately reside in Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan.  The Koryo 
saram (re)established group identity based on altering homeland perception and adaptation in 
ever-changing host-lands.  Chong Jin Oh (2007) articulates an adaptive identity within the Koryo 
saram diaspora.  Originally the Koryo saram transitioned to life under Tsarist Russia, then Soviet 
rule, and now independent Central Asian states.  Following their removal from the Far East in 
1937, Soviet Koreans underwent intense assimilation, challenging the persistence of their 
identity (Diener 2006, 2009). 
Origins and Identity of the Koryo Saram 
The Koryo saram first arrived in the tsarist Russia in the mid-nineteenth century (Diener 
2009; Gelb 1995; Kim 2003/4).  Due to successive famines on the peninsula and social 
marginalization by the ruling monarchy, northern Koreans from what would become North 
Hamgyeong Province continued large-scale migrations into Russia’s maritime region and settled 
into already prominent Korean villages (Diener 2009; Fumagalli 2012; Kim 2001; Pohl 1999).  
Initially tsarist Russia maintained a tolerant stance on foreign migrants and allowed access to 
farmland, and the Koryo saram became prominent in agriculture, industry, and politics.  By 1883 
it is reported that there were over 32,000 registered Koreans in the Russian Far East (Gelb 1995), 
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with a potential of almost 58,000 more that were either illegal or non-citizens (Diener 2009).  
While in the Russian Far East the Koryo saram “developed a strong social group” with different 
and distinct traditions unlike other Koreans in linguistic, social, and cultural customs (Oh 2006).  
Even in the early days of migration along the Russo-Korean border there are records of Russian 
speaking Koreans (Kim and King 2010). 
Russification, and later Sovietization, may appear to be cultural deformation because of 
changes in language, culture, and political ideology, but the Koryo saram left dynastic Korea 
facing intense government discrimination and Russification was seen as the modernization many 
of the Koryo saram desired.  Due to their socio-cultural marginalization within the “homeland” 
during the Joseon Period (1392-1910) and subsequent life in the Russian Far East, the Koryo 
saram established a distinct culture from that of peninsular Koreans (Schmid 2002; Lee 1965; 
Robinson 2010; Wells 2002).     
After the tsarist defeat in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, Japan claimed the Korean 
peninsula as a protectorate, and tsarist Russia enacted policies forcing ethnic Koreans to obtain 
Russian citizenship and instituted partial relocation of Koreans away from the borderlands 
(Diener 2009; Gelb 1995; Kim 2003/4; Kim 2001).  Protectorate status of the homeland 
continued to encourage ethnic Koreans to emigrate from the peninsula, and the formal 
annexation of Korea into the Japanese Empire in 1910 brought another swell of immigrants to 
Russia, increasing anxiety within the Tsarist government (Diener 2009; Gelb 1995; Pohl 1999).
 The Japanese occupation of the Korean peninsula encouraged Russo-Koreans to become 
“the enemies of the Bolsheviks’ enemies” and during the Russian Revolution of 1917 the Koryo 
saram supported the Bolsheviks (Diener 2009; Gelb 1995; Kim 2001).  Most Koreans in the 
Russian Far East saw the Revolution as a means of liberating their homeland, but the Soviet 
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Koreans saw the opportunity vanish with Japanese annexation of Manchuria in 1931.  Further 
Japanese expansion raised alarm in Soviet Russia, and brought about the relocation and forced 
naturalization of Koreans within Soviet borders, although neither action halted illegal 
immigration (Gelb 1995; Pohl 1999).   
Due to the loss of a physical homeland, the Korean nationalist movement made great 
efforts to unify the diaspora community on behalf of Korean independence, but were 
unsuccessful in mobilization (Lee 1965).  Many of the groups within the Korean diaspora 
community were either too distant (i.e., in the United States or Europe), while others were overly 
proximal (within the Japanese Empire’s realm of influence) to have any effect.  In the case of the 
Koryo saram, the original community included multi-generational Koreans who had left the 
peninsula decades before the popular nationalist movement and were unconcerned with assisting 
what was perceived to be a discriminatory and oppressive monarchy, while many of the new 
migrants – some of which were caught up in the nationalist cause – fled to Manchuria when 
allowed by the Soviet government before deportation (Lee 1965). 
Soviet mistrust of the Koryo saram is generally ascribed to the impending threat of 
Japanese expansionism and potential of espionage infiltration from ethnic Koreans sympathetic 
to Japan (Gelb 1995; Kim and King 2010).  While Korean spies were utilized by both Russian 
and Japanese military forces (Caprio 2010), German Kim (2001) proposes that the deportation 
was not a radical decision based solely on Soviet national security, but that the deportation of the 
Koryo saram was a continuation of former tsarist policies.  Although there was some fear of 
Korean political subversion, immigrants provided major agricultural development, cheap labor, 
and “stabilizing effects of industrious, unpretentious, and law-abiding citizens” (Kim and King 
2010, p.258).  Other major issues – aside from potential espionage – in the deportation of the 
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Koryo saram include the Soviet plan to begin rice cultivation in Kazakhstan, labor shortages in 
the Central Asian Soviet republics, and the Soviet military exploitation of infrastructure left 
behind by the Koreans (Kim 2001).  All things considered, “the basic reason was rooted in the 
high-level domestic and foreign policies of Stalin’s totalitarian regime” (ibid).  In 1937 a two-
phased removal project of the entire population of the Koryo saram, nearly 200,000 ethnic 
Koreans, was loaded onto trains for a month-long relocation at the onset of winter and became 
the first forced deportation of an entire ethnic group orchestrated by the Stalin regime (Gelb 
1995; Kim 2001; Pohl 1999). 
During the Soviet era, the Koryo saram underwent a massive identity shift, suffering 
“great losses in the realm of national culture” (Oh 2007, p.157).  Increased Sovietization in 
Central Asia initiated the simultaneous creation of new cultural tradition and identity, further 
distinguishing the Koryo saram from their ethnic kin (Kim 2003/4).  The onset of perestroika 
allowed a “revival” of traditional Korean culture and identity, and numerous South Korean 
cultural centers and Christian churches were established in Central Asia (Kim and Khan 2001).  
Despite the desire and efforts to reacquaint the Koryo saram with ‘true Korean culture’, the main 
problem contributing to the lack of success of the cultural centers within the various Central 
Asian states is attributed by Kim and Khan (2001) to the Koryo saram “possessing their own 
culture” and being “in no way obliged to imitate the culture of the Korean peninsula.”  Despite 
their socio-cultural differences, certain trends are manifest among the Koryo saram that are 
common throughout the Korean diaspora community, forming a bridge between host-lands and 
homeland. 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, both Koreas sought to establish diplomatic 
and economic relations with the individual Central Asian republics and, although North Korean 
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ventures have fallen short due to a lack of economic stability and investment, South Korean 
business investments have brought the Central Asian Koreans closer to their ethnic kin (Kim and 
Khan 2001; Oh 2007; Tae 2001).  The Koryo saram, like other groups within the Korean 
diaspora community, have a high rate of urbanization within their various host-lands.  Within 
Central Asian states urbanization is a fairly new phenomenon, due to the residual effects of 
Soviet rule, but nonetheless, a vast majority of the younger generations of the Koryo saram are 
migrating to major city centers (Oh, 2006; Tae 2001).  Along with this major urban migration is 
the common trend of entrepreneurship among Korean minority groups, as well as a tendency to 
relocate to areas with a higher concentration of their ethnic kin (Oka 2001).  
Despite ethnic kinship and similarities in socio-economic tendencies, as well as South 
Korean business ventures and the establishment of Korean cultural centers within Central Asian 
states, the connection of the Koryo saram and South Korea cannot be seen as a “cultural revival” 
due to the drastic social and cultural divergence between Central Asian Koreans and South 
Koreans (Kim 2003/4; Kim and Khan 2001).  For example, communication technologies that 
usually contribute to a diaspora’s connection with its homeland, but Korean telecommunication 
systems focus operations more on the Northeast Asian and North American regions, rather than 
Central Asia, and radio and television networks available to the Koryo saram are broadcast in 
Korean or English, despite their Russian-speaking audience (Brinkerhoff 2009; Kim 2003/4; 
Kim and Khan 2001; Oh 2007).   
The dissolution of the Soviet Union created multiple host-lands, primary agents in 
diaspora identity construction.  Central Asian states nationalizing their new territories create rifts 
between the Koryo saram (Oh, 2007).  According to Cohen (1996) compulsory means tend to 
alienate the diaspora group; generally the stronger the compulsion, the less the diaspora group 
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tends to acculturate and assimilate into host-land society, but this does not seem to be the case in 
regards to the Koryo saram.  Soviet Koreans were able to maintain traditional economic roles 
such as rice cultivation and fishing, despite major changes regarding language and ideology 
during Sovietization (Kim 2003/4; Diener 2006). 
After removal from the Far East, Soviet Koreans underwent intense assimilation, 
challenging the persistence of their identity (Diener 2009, 2006).  In the decades since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, it has become clear that Soviet and, now, Kazakh, Uzbek, and 
Kyrgyz nationalist policy has separated the Koryo saram from their “cultural and ethnic roots” 
(ibid, p.158; Kim 2003/4).  Diener’s (2006) study on the concept of homeland among Korean-
Kazakhstanis reveals an interesting trend in identity perception.  A majority of the Koryo saram 
in his study view Kazakhstan as their homeland, despite an increase in “ethnic culture and ethnic 
history” awareness (p. 207-209).  According to surveys distributed among the Koryo saram in 
Uzbekistan, I found that while all those polled consider the Korean peninsula as the homeland of 
ethnic Koreans, they do not consider it the Koryo saram homeland.  Instead, among the Koryo 
saram that responded, all considered place of birth (Uzbekistan, Russia, and the former Soviet 
Union) as their homeland. 
Despite diaspora conception and establishment of identity partially on the basis of a 
common cultural history (Shuval 2000), it is clear that the multi-generational feature amended to 
identify diasporas is a two-edged sword.  Surely the Koryo saram have become more aware of 
themselves as a distinct socio-cultural element within the Korean ethnic community, but they 
simultaneously seem to maintain Central Asian state identity more than Korean ethnic identity.  
So are the Koryo saram still a diaspora?  They exhibit some of Cohen’s (1996) criteria, yet many 
maintain the notion of respective Central Asian states as their homelands.  Members of particular 
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ethnic groups may have intent and opportunity to assimilate and relinquish their prior identity in 
an effort to acquire greater social mobility or marry outside of their ethnic group, which slowly 
diminishes the sense of a distinguishable diaspora; in essence they transform their notion of 
homeland.  Cohen (1996, pp. 516-517) argues that “a strong attachment to the past or a barrier to 
assimilation in the present and future must exist in order to permit a diasporic consciousness to 
emerge or be retained.”  But where is the homeland of the Koryo saram?  Despite Oh’s (2007) 
belief that South Korea holds the power to “revitalize” the Korean-ness of the Koryo saram, 
evidence reveals South Korea’s ethno-cultural interactions are a guise for economic pursuits.  
The lack of return migration following the dissolution of the Soviet Union is a fair indicator 
because the Koryo saram do not maintain a sense of belonging in North or South Korea.4  The 
Korean peninsula has undergone such dramatic changes in recent history that any ideal homeland 
existing in that space would be unfamiliar to the Koryo saram. 
 
 
                                                          
4In comparison, Sonya Ryang (1997) notes that there were over 2 million Koreans in Japan in 1945, while only 
around 600,000 remain today after significant repatriation to North Korea. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
IMAGINED HOMELAND: NATIONALIST CONSTRUCTION OF KOREAN HISTORY 
 For centuries the Korean peninsula has been vital to geopolitics in Northeast Asia and a 
crossroads of empires.  Historically, Japan viewed Korea as an opportunity to expand its territory 
into mainland Asia, Russia sought the abundant warm-water ports of the peninsula, and China 
has seen Korea as an independent, yet subordinate, appendage to its various dynasties.  
Throughout its history, Korea has been a land of turmoil, reflected in the Korean lamentation, 
“when whales fight, the shrimp’s back is broken.”  Over four thousand years ago Central Asian 
tribes migrated toward the Pacific coast and established various centers of East Asian civilization.  
The Buyeo tribe settled in modern-day Manchuria, and eventually migrated southward into the 
peninsula.  The physical landscape of the Korean peninsula provided a haven, surrounded on 
three sides by the sea and protected by the mountains to the north, where the Buyeo people found 
a place to develop a unique culture and an ethnic homeland. 
This chapter situates the Koryo saram within an historical setting to discuss the ethno- 
and socio-cultural division between the “homeland” and the diaspora group.  While it foregoes 
some historical events vital to Korean history, society, and culture, the purpose is to highlight 
South Korean nationalist discourse that disrupts senses of belonging among the Koryo saram, as 
well as expanding perceptions of the historic homeland beyond the Korean peninsula. 
Dan-gun and the Origin of the Korean Ethnos 
“The Old Record notes that in olden times Hwanin’s son, Hwanung, wished to descend 
from Heaven and live in the world of human beings.  Knowing his son’s desire, Hwanin 
surveyed the three highest mountains and found Mount T’aebaek the most suitable place 
for his son to settle and help human beings.  Therefore [Hwanin]…dispatched [Hwanung] 
to rule over the people….  At that time a bear and a tiger living in the same cave prayed 
to Holy Hwanung to transform them into human beings.  The king gave them a bundle of 
sacred mugworts and twenty cloves of garlic and said, ‘If you eat these and shun the 
sunlight for one hundred days, you will assume human form.’  Both animals ate the 
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spices and avoided the sun.  After twenty-one days the bear became a woman but the 
tiger, unable to observe the taboo, remained a tiger.  Unable to find a husband the bear-
woman prayed under the altar tree for a child.  Hwanung metamorphosed himself, lay 
with her, and begot a son called Tangun Wang-gom.” 
 
– Dangun Creation Myth from Samguk yusa (History of the Three Kingdoms) 1:33-34, 
translated by Peter H. Lee (UCLA) (Lee and De Bary 1997, pp.5-6) 
 
 There are anthropological and archeological arguments about the origin of proto-Korean 
peoples, but according to Korean nationalists, ethnic Koreans first came to the peninsula from 
the Heavens when Dan-gun established the ancient kingdom of Old Joseon (Kr. Gojoseon) (Lee 
and De Bary 1997; Pratt 2007; Robinson 2007).  The historian-monk Iryeon (1206-1289) first 
recorded the myth (excerpt quoted above) that recounts Hwanung’s decent from heaven to the 
“world of man” and his marriage to a she-bear, who in turn bore Dan-gun, the founder of the first 
Korean kingdom and father of the Korean nation (Lee and De Bary 1997). 
 The Dan-gun myth established its influence in Korean culture during the onset of 
Japanese dominance within Northeast Asia.  B.R. Myers (2010) argues that the legend of Dan-
gun was revived as a direct result of the Japanese occupation of Korea in 1905 to combat the 
Japanese propaganda machine highlighting Korea as a region of Japan, which maintained that the 
Korean language was a dialect of Japanese.  In response, Dan-gun emerged as a nationalist 
propaganda tool.  According to Myers (2010, p.27), although the ancient myth had been “largely 
ignored for centuries …, the tale gave the Koreans their own pure bloodline.”  Nationalist 
discourse not only revitalized the myth of Dan-gun, but embellished the record with geographic 
symbols (geomancy) in order to reinforce the claim of the peninsula as a homeland for Koreans.  
The Korean foundation myth identified Mt. Baek-du as the birthplace of Dan-gun in 2333 before 
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the Common Era.5  This is viewed by Myers (ibid) as a “counterpart to Japan’s sacred Mount 
Fuji” as the nationalist movement sought to distinguish their identity from their colonial 
overlords’.  The vitality of this myth in Korean society is exemplified by the 1909 formation of a 
shamanic-based Korean religion known as Daejonggyo (Religion of Great Ancestors or 
Dangunism) by Na Ch’eol (1864-1916).  This religion was based on the worship of the 
mythological founder of the Korean nation and was a main organizational network of Korean 
nationalist movements (Ch’oe et al. 2000, p. 298; Schmid 2002).  Although the role of Dan-gun 
– whether as a god or as the progenitor of the nation – was disputed, after the 1910 Japanese 
colonization membership rose from 20,000 to 300,000 in 1914 (Schmid 2002). 
The ancient establishment of the Korean nation by Dan-gun was vital in providing a myth 
of a consanguineous “imagined” ethnicity and nation (Schmid 2002).  Keith Pratt (2007, p. 33) 
notes nationalist rhetoric during the colonial period reiterated the Dan-gun myth to a point that 
“under conditions of colonial occupation…it began to acquire a veneer of historical 
respectability,” and has since gained clout as the progenitor of the Korean nation. 
A Forgotten Homeland: The Kingdom of Balhae 
 The Three Kingdoms period (221-265 CE) is highlighted by geopolitical intrigue 
between Chinese, Japanese, and Korean kingdoms.  Each kingdom on the Korean peninsula 
maintained founding legends, of which Dan-gun was only one (Lee 1965; Pratt 2007). Although 
the boundaries were fluid and borders shifted constantly, the largest of these three kingdoms6 
was Goguryeo, which occupied Manchuria, portions of the Russian Far East, and over half of the 
                                                          
5 During the rule of the Koryo dynasty (918-1392), the cycle of kingdoms were kept according to the Dan-gun 
calendar (Lee and De Bary 1997, p.258). 
6 During most of the three kingdoms period, there were actually five kingdoms located on the Korean peninsula – 
the fourth and fifth being Gaya, located between Silla and Baekje, and Buyeo to the northwest of Goguryeo, in 
central Manchuria. 
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Korean peninsula (Kim 2011).  The other two kingdoms were Baekje and Silla.  The kingdom of 
Baekje controlled territory ranging north of modern-day Pyeongyang and extending southward 
and westward of an uneven line down the center of the peninsula, eventually terminating at its 
southernmost end.  Silla occupied the smallest territory of the three kingdoms; its capital was 
located at Gyeongju and the territory occupied the current South Korean provinces of north and 
south Gyeongsang (Pratt 2007).  These three kingdoms vied for control over the Korean 
peninsula, allying with both China and Japan.  In 660 CE, combined Silla and T’ang (China) 
forces took the Baekje capital of Gongju and acquired its territory.  Less than a decade later, in 
668 CE, the Silla–T’ang alliance overtook Pyeongyang and the southernmost territories 
controlled by Goguryeo.   This expansion is hailed as the first unification of Koreans, and the 
unified kingdom of Silla ruled the peninsula for over two centuries (668-918) (Pratt 2007; 
Robinson 2007; Schmid 2002). 7 
 
                                                          
7 The term “unification” is in quotations because the nationalist-historian Sin Ch’aeho refutes “Unified Silla” on the 
grounds that it did not conquer Manchuria, an historically Korean territory (Schmid 2002, p.231). 
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Map1: During the Three Kingdoms Period (57-668 CE) the major kingdoms of Goguryo, 
Baekje, and Silla vied for control of the Korean peninsula – which was accomplished by 
‘Unified Silla’ in 668.  Created by Aaron Taveras, Nov. 2014. 
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 Despite the designation of the historical period of “Unified Silla,” the territorial extent of 
this specific Korean kingdom was limited to south of the Phae River (now the Daedong River) 
(Henthorn 1931; Kim 2011).  Neither Silla nor T’ang obtained control of the former expanse of 
the Goguryeo kingdom (Kim 2011).  After the fall of Goguryeo in the year 668, a successor 
kingdom was established in 698 by Dae Jo-yeong (Ch’oe, Lee, and De Bary 2000; Henthorn 
1931; Kim 2011; Roehrig 2010).  Silla is credited with unifying the Korean peninsula, and by 
extension the Korean nation, and within South Korean history and nationalist discourse the 
existence of Balhae is de-emphasized in relation to Unified Silla (Kim 2001; Ro 2000). 
 After the establishment of the kingdom of Jin (698/699 CE) by Dae Jo-yeong, the official 
recognition of the kingdom by the T’ang Empire in 713 CE required a renaming of the kingdom 
to Balhae (Henthorn 1931; Kim 2011).  T’ang influence was reflected in Balhae society and 
government structure, but Balhae was considered an independent kingdom (Henthorn 1931; Kim 
2011; Kim 2011; Roehrig 2010; Song 1995).  Balhae maintained diplomatic and economic ties 
with T’ang, Japan, and various Central Asian Turkic and Mongol tribes, including the Khitan 
(Henthorn 1931).  Balhae scholars studied alongside those of T’ang and Silla; Balhae also sent 
Buddhist monks to study in T’ang (Henthorn 1931; Kim 2011; Song 1995).  Balhae extended its 
power to its fullest during the reign of Dae Heom-mu (737-793 CE) by establishing firmer 
relations with the T’ang Empire, forming a military alliance with Japan, and establishing 
embassies throughout Turkic Central Asia and Persia (Kim 2011; Noh 1997).  According to Tae-
don Noh (1997), Balhae served as a continuation of Goguryeo in the political view of the Central 
Asian kingdoms and tribes; Balhae representatives referred to the kingdom as ‘Goryeo’ 
internationally and it was recognized as a political and economic power. 
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 Before the fall of Balhae in 926, Khitan tribes raided the borders and forced many 
citizens of Balhae to flee to the southern neighbor kingdom of Goryeo (918-1392), which had 
overthrown Silla (Pratt 2007; Ro 2000; Robinson 2007; Schmid 2002).  Subsequent migrations 
from formerly controlled Balhae territory occurred sporadically until 934 CE, and were openly 
received as citizens of Goryeo (Ch’oe, Lee, and De Bary 2000; Henthorn 1931; Pratt 2007; Ro 
2000).  “The perception of Parhae [Balhae] history was influenced by the notion of succession 
from a preceding dynasty to a following dynasty sanctioned by the Heavenly mandate” (Ro 2000, 
pp.125-126).  Goryeo viewed Balhae as a branch of the line from Goguryeo and both could be 
seen as legitimate successor states (Noh 1997; Ro 2000).  The legitimacy of Balhae as a 
successor state to Goguryeo was maintained by ethnic, cultural, and geographic consciousness 
and identity (Ro 2000).   
Former citizens of Balhae participated in the political bureaucracy of Liao, Jin, and 
Northern Song dynasties for over 400 years after their kingdom’s demise in 926 and can be 
considered “a considerable force in northeast Asian history” (Kim 2011, pp. 287-288; see also 
Ro 2000).  In History of the Divine Tan’gun’s People, the nationalist-historian Kim Gyoheon 
defined the Balhae, Liao, Jin, and Qing dynasties as paramount to the history of the Korean 
nation as the northern branch of Dan-gun’s lineage (Schmid 2002), as well as refuting the 
nationalist construction of the “unification” of the Korean nation by Silla. 
In order to maintain notion of the Korean nation as primordial and pre-dating the 
Japanese nation, nationalist rhetoric emphasized the unification of the peninsula by Silla.  While 
this discourse maintains prominence in Korean history today, some Korean nationalist during the 
colonial period saw the exclusion of Balhae from Korean records as a grave omission (Ch’oe, 
Lee, and De Bary 2000).  One of the most prominent Korean nationalist advocates was the 
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historian Sin Ch’aeho (1880-1936).  According to Sin the nation must be an “historically defined 
ethnic entity” (cited in Schmid 2002, p. 181), although “history was not of the state, but of a 
more fundamental matter, the minjok,” or Korean nation (Schmid 2002, p. 190).  Sin saw ethnic 
identity as an inherent, not constructed, aspect of history, and the Korean nation was presented as 
a “natural entity” (Schmid 2002, p.182).  According to Michael Robinson (1986) Sin Ch’aeho 
encouraged national identity to be constructed through an emerging historical consciousness. 
 Sin’s “new” national history was based on Korean control of Manchuria.  From Dan-
gun’s ancient kingdom of Gojoseon and the Balhae kingdom’s succession, Manchuria played a 
major role in Korean identity and took “center stage” (Schmid 2002).  Balhae (698-926) was 
considered by certain Korean nationalists as a distinctly Korean kingdom founded by a 
Goguryeo general, and Sin argued that Balhae and Goryeo were parts of a singular whole, 
indicating the nation transcends current and historic borders (Kim 2011; Schmid 2002).  The 
vitality of Balhae expands the perception of a Korean historical homeland beyond the peninsula, 
and establishes Balhae territory as an extension of the perceived Korean ethnic homeland. 
In Schmid’s (1997) analysis of Sin Ch’aeho’s works regarding a “Korean Manchuria” 
there is evidence of a distinct ethno-national tie of Koreans to former Balhae territory.  
According to Roehrig (2010) Balhae as a Korean state is intrinsically linked to the establishment 
of Korean national identity.  Balhae controlled territory was vital to the identity of Koreans in 
regards to the Dan-gun myth and the origin of Koreans as an ethnicity, further validating Balhae 
as a successor state of Goguryeo (Roehrig 2010; Schmid 2002).  The Korean nation should not 
be merely consigned to be classified as a “peninsular nation” (Kr. bando-guk), although it 
maintains an historical basis within records of ensuing dynasties – especially in regards to 
Korean rulers being subordinates to the Chinese Son of Heaven (Schmid 2002).  But Schmid 
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(ibid) notes the emphasis that Sin Ch’aeho places on the success of the Korean state and its 
control of Manchuria: 
How intimate is the connection between Korea and Manchuria? When the Korean race 
obtains Manchuria, the Korean race is strong and prosperous.  When another race obtains 
Manchuria, the Korean race is inferior and recedes…. This is an iron rule that has not 
changed for four thousand years. 
 
Schmid (2002) notes that Sin is basing the validity of Korean identity, as an ethnicity, singularly 
on its territorial possessions, particularly Manchuria.  Despite his emphasis on territory, Sin sees 
the elimination of Balhae from Korean records as more of a psychological defacing of identity, 
rather than purely a loss of territory.  Not only are Manchuria and the Russian Far East vital to 
the history of Balhae, but these territories pertain greatly to the identity of Korean ethnicity, 
particularly the Koryo saram and their imagined homeland conception beyond the peninsula. 
Global Emergence of the Hermit Kingdom and the Formation of Korean Nationalism 
 The kingdom of Joseon (1392-1910) succeeded Goryeo, and after multiple invasions by 
Japanese and Manchu forces the Joseon dynasty sealed its borders and was labeled “the Hermit 
Kingdom” (Lee 1965; Pratt 2007; Robinson 2007).  The Yi dynasty ruled the Korean peninsula 
from 1392 until Japanese occupation in 1910 (Lee 1965; Robinson 2007).  Although 
Confucianism was introduced during the Three Kingdoms Period, it was re-furbished as a 
government policy during the neo-Confucian Joseon (Lee 1965).  Neo-Confucian government 
policy was a major factor in the development of Korean national identity and in initial 
emigration of the Koryo saram.  Joseon rulers neglected the dynamic global interactions and 
were therefore unable to defend against future threats of Russian and Japanese territorial 
expansions (Ch’oe, Lee, and De Bary 2000). 
 Joseon society valued cultural development and maintenance rather than economic and 
political efficiency (Lee 1965).  Sino-centric cultural tradition was upheld by the ruling elite and 
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was a root cause of the nationalist movement (Robinson 1986; Schmid 2002).  Nationalists 
attributed many of Korea’s faults to social, cultural, and political subservience to China (Schmid 
2002).  The waning years of Joseon rule were marked by corruption and civil disorder (Schmid 
2002).  The elite class was seen as the cause of Joseon’s demise, and by extension, the eventual 
colonization of Korea (Schmid 2002).  Even during the turn of the century, as nationalist 
tendencies were becoming popular in Korea, many of the uprisings were more concerned with 
reforming the government rather than unifying behind the anti-Japanese banner (Lee 1965).  
During Joseon rule, class distinction fractured regional and social interactions until Japanese 
occupation forced government and social reforms, dismantling the Korean aristocracy (Lee 1965; 
Wells 2002). 
 Prevalent regionalism resulted in marginalization and resentment in the northern 
provinces (Ch’oe, Lee, and De Bary 2000; Lee 1965; Schmid 2002).  During Joseon rule, the 
northern region of Korea experienced political discrimination and “social and cultural abuses 
that … drove them to become extremely resentful” (Kim 2011, pp.8, 11-12; see also Lee 1965). 
Such political discrimination led many northern Koreans to be more accepting of foreign, 
predominately Western, ideas and ideologies, becoming valuable cultural capital to foreign 
interests within the peninsula (Kim 2011; Moon 2010).  Mark E. Caprio (2010) argues that 
northern Koreans at the time were known for their mistrust of central governments, self-reliant 
spirit, and independent disposition.  Northern Koreans “did not recognize time-honored 
Confucian hierarchies,” which may account for political marginalization and distrust by the 
Joseon ruling elite (Caprio 2010, p. 307).  Citizens in Korea’s northern provinces were 
considered “enemies of the state” because of their forward-thinking attitudes and peripheral 
geographic location (Caprio 2010; Kang 2001; Kim and King 2010).   
 34 
Regionalism was not only manifested in political objectives, but in national identity as 
well.  Creating a nation is reliant upon imagining a homogenous community (Caprio 2010).  
Despite the nationalist claim of an unbroken succession of consanguineous identity, regionalism 
and regional stereotyping maintained potency into the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  While the Yi dynasty implemented public policy in an effort to nationalize Korean 
identity, the programs focused on how to “civilize” the northern provinces (Kim 2011). 
 During Joseon rule trans-boundary migration was common and the northeastern 
provinces of Korea were a “frontier zone of interaction” (Robinson 2010, p.22-23).    The 
porosity of Joseon’s northern borders denotes the lack of government control in the northern 
region, as their political influence was incongruent with territorial boundaries (Robinson 2010; 
Schmid 2002).  “The Russo-Korean ‘contact zone’ [extended] from northeast Korea into the 
Russian Maritime Region” and Korean migration into the Russian Far East began in the mid-
1860s, with several waves of migration into the region until the 1920s (Kim and King 2010).  
Russia expanded into the Far East in 1856, taking control of territory with major Korean 
populations (Lee 1965).  Russians and Koreans had regular contact along the border zone and 
migrants from northern Korea were drawn to the Russian Far East because of its Western ideals 
and opportunities (Kim and King 2010; Schmid 2002).  The Russo-Korean boundary was fluid 
before the Japanese occupation (Schmid 2002) and seasonal migrant workers were allowed 
unhindered travel between the two countries (Bougai 1996).  Many Koreans had moved from 
northern provinces across the Tumen (Kr. Duman) and Yalu (Kr. Amnok) rivers in order to 
escape famine, and by 1882 had established prominent settlements within Manchuria and the 
Russian Empire (Schmid 2002).  Vladivostok hosted a major Korean immigrant population by 
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the 1870s, and it is even argued by Kim and King (2010) that South Ussuri krai was merely an 
extension of Korea’s northwestern region. 
 As Chinese dominance in Northeast Asia waned, the Meiji Restoration brought Japan to 
the forefront of the Northeast Asian regional power structure.  The newly modernized Japanese 
Empire and expanding Tsarist Russia were poised for expansion into the now exposed Korean 
peninsula (Robinson 2007).  In 1876 the Hermit Kingdom was coerced into international society 
by Meiji Japan (Lee 1965; Robinson 2007; Robinson 1986).  Until then Korea was on the fringe 
of the world system, only exercising international political relations with China, until the Treaty 
of Kanghwa “exposed Korea to unprecedented outside influences” (Robinson 2007, p. 15; see 
also Robinson 1986).  The opening of Korea to Western ideas and ideologies moved Korean 
historians to view their past through a new lens, applying the idea of the nation-state to their 
dynastic history and reexamine their culture as a homogeneous society and nation (Robinson 
2007; Robinson 1986).  After their defeat in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), the Qing 
dynasty was forced to recognize Korean independence and Japan seized the opportunity to obtain 
territory on the Asian mainland (Lee 1965; Robinson 2007; Schmid 2002).  The Treaty of 
Shimonoseki (1985) forced changes to Korea’s political identity, and the recreated identity 
provided a new scope wherewith to view their history.   
After centuries of mimicry, many new nationalist Koreans saw China as “lacking 
civilization” because of the new Western ‘other’ of comparison (Schmid 2002, p. 57).  This 
decentering of China from Korean politics, culture, and society was “integral to the rearticulation 
of Korean identity” (ibid), and the years following the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki saw 
a significant increase of Korean people’s interaction with foreigners, particularly within the 
northern provinces (Lee 1965; Moon 2010).  The Japanese occupation of Korea was an issue of 
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sovereignty, highlighting the integrated issues of nationalism and identity (Wells 2002, p. 186).  
Japanese victory changed regional geopolitics in Northeast Asia. Eliminating China from 
geopolitical activity in the Far East left the fate of Korean sovereignty to Japanese and Russian 
territorial expansionism and brought the peninsula to the forefront of international rivalries (Lee 
1965; Robinson 2007; Schmid 2002; Spector 2007).  Japan began to enforced the Meiji ideology 
of Pan-Asianism8 to “protect Korean sovereignty” and reform the Korean cultural system; Russia 
was seen as a threat to “Asians” and it was thought necessary to “remove Russian influences” 
from Korea (Moon 2010; Park 2010; Schmid 2002).   
After the Sino-Japanese War, Japan and Russia sought dominance in the wane of Chinese 
influence in Korea, as well as Manchuria (Schmid 2002).  Russia and Japan both sought 
territorial expansion, but “everything that Japan and Russia did in Korea was in the name of 
Korean independence” (Lee 1965).  Japan offered Russia predominance in Manchuria, but 
Korea’s warm-water ports drew Russia into further involvement on the peninsula, eventually 
leading to the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) (Lee 1965; Robinson 2007; Schmid 2002).  
Victory over Russia provided Japan with an unimpeded opportunity to occupy Korea (Lee 1965).  
Prior to, and during the Russo-Japanese War, Japan was seen as the protector of Korea, rather 
than a threat to national sovereignty (Caprio 2010; Schmid 2002).  Even during the war, many 
Korean newspapers supported Japan, linking regional identity to racial differentiation, and 
necessitating Japanese victory for the good of all Asians (Schmid 2002).  After Japan’s victory 
over Russia, Korea became a suzerain of Japan (1905), and Japan oversaw management of 
                                                          
8 Pan-Asian discourse was not popular in the northwestern provinces, and northern Koreans, unlike southern 
Koreans, held avid anti-Japanese sentiments, while maintaining high regard for Russia (Kim and King 2010, p.281; 
Moon 2010, p.208). 
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Korean foreign relations (Lee 1965; Schmid 2002).  Establishment of Japanese hegemony in 
Northeast Asia brought Western ideas to the Joseon dynasty.  The de-centering of China and 
nationalist discourse introduced via the Meiji Restoration “were integral to Korean self-
knowledge” (Schmid 2002, p. 142).  In 1906, after victory over Russia, Japan was recognized as 
the de facto ruling state in Asia after King Kojong’s efforts in the Hague failed to eradicate the 
Japanese from the peninsula and create the Korean nation-state (Schmid 2002). 
The 1910 annexation of Korea saw the territorial body of the Korean nation “stolen” yet 
the imagined identity was vital to the nationalist movement (Schmid 2002).  During the Japanese 
occupation the Korean nation was de-territorialized, but place maintained its role in national and 
diaspora identity, thus history, language, and religion became intangible symbols of the of the 
nation, as well as the peninsula (Schmid 2002).  Not only did the Japanese take control of the 
state government, but Korea’s territory – the homeland – no longer belonged to the Korean 
nation.  Nationalist discourse in Korea expanded “in an age when the peninsula had been 
incorporated into the global capitalist order with its universalizing, modern ideologies” (ibid, 
p.198), and as Korean sovereignty dissolved, the nation uncoupled itself from its territory, and 
Korean identity was legitimated beyond the peninsula (Robinson 2007; Schmid 2002).   
During the colonial period Korean territory and identity was shaped by Western discourse 
of the nation-state.  The Japanese Empire instituted colonial ideology in an effort to form a more 
unified Japanese-Korean identity marked by cultural, social, and political assimilation; Japanese 
sought to annex Korean territory, as well as Korean ethnicity into that of the Japanese nation 
through Pan-Asian discourse (Caprio 2010; Kang 2001; Robinson 1986; Schmid 2002).  Due to 
the lack of a sovereign state, Korean nationalists soon shifted from a state-centric view of the 
nation to an ethno-centric view (Schmid 2002).  The nationalist movement saw the development 
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of a Korean nation-state as necessary to ethnic survival (Robinson 2007; Robinson 1986).  
According to prominent nationalist leaders, Koreans were not yet sophisticated enough in their 
sense of patriotism or sense of national identity to maintain a sovereign nation-state (Robinson 
1986). 
Early Korean nationalists insisted that the historical bond between Korea and China had 
to be re-evaluated and the process of what Andre Schmid (2002, p. 55) calls “decentering the 
Middle Kingdom” brought about the “sustenance of a pure culture.”  Cultural detachment from 
China allowed the Korean national identity to (re)construct its history as an independent state, no 
longer under the shadow of neighboring China.  This decentering from politics, culture, and 
society was “integral to the rearticulation of Korean identity” (Schmid 2002, p. 57; see also 
Robinson 1986).  The historic interconnection of Korean symbols to China was not a true 
foundation for the nationalist movement, and thus nationalist movements became motivated to 
focus on a geographic, place-based foundation of Korean identity (Schmid 2002).  Schmid (2002, 
pp. 60-61, 175) notes that distinction of Korean nationality was distinguished “almost wholly by 
its spatial source,” yet after colonization by Japan and the loss of the territorial identity, Korean 
nationalists sought to establish an historically based national identity.  During this time of 
historical reconstruction, the Dan-gun myth emerged as a national identifier and provided a 
foundational myth for the kingdom of Ancient Joseon (Gojoseon) – the “oldest of the peninsular 
kingdoms” – and the Korean nation (Schmid 2002, p.175). 
Not until the establishment of Korea as a protectorate did the term minjok (nation) enter 
into popular usage in Korea, even among nationalists; even the Tonghak Rebellion (1894-1895) 
formed without the literal sense of the Korean nation (Moon 2010; Schmid 2002).  Like the 
nation itself, the terminology of ‘nation’ was not conceived until after colonization.  In its 
 39 
earliest conception and designation, the Korean nation was territorially bound to the peninsula, 
ruling out inclusion of the earliest dispersions within the “nation” (Schmid 2002). 
The Tonghak Rebellion is often viewed as the first Korean nationalist movement, 
although this is highly debated.  The Tonghak Rebellion should be seen as a religious learning 
movement centered on xenophobia, although aspects of the movement were surrounded by a 
misguided nationalist sense of ethnic identity (Lee 1965).  In reality, the Tonghak Rebellion did 
more for Korean nationalism because of its historical timing rather than its role as a political 
movement.  At a time when the Joseon dynasty was too weak to quell the rebellion, the Tonghak 
Movement provided the Japanese Empire with the opportunity to move troops onto the peninsula 
(Lee 1965).  Consequently, efforts by the Tonghak Rebellion to further alienate the Korean 
peninsula from the outside world were the prime forces in introducing Meiji-style reform via 
Japanese occupation. 
Michael E. Robinson (1986, pp. 35-36) notes that Korean nationalism was constructed 
through a “systematic examination of the sources of Western strength, while simultaneously 
criticizing their own tradition as a source of weakness.”  In retrospect, nationalists and 
intellectuals viewed the restrictive and closed-door economic and political policies as detrimental 
to the development of the Korean nation and state (Robinson 2007).  Schmid’s (2002) discussion 
concerning the de-centering of China provided a significant alteration in Korean world view, and 
consequently, their new national identity (Robinson 2007).  Essentially, Korean nationalism was 
not nationalistic at all, but a revolution against the Yi dynasty 500-year long rule.  It was actually 
not until the First World War came to a close and discourse of national self-determination 
reached Korea that the populace identified itself – even then, only those involved with the 
movement – as a “nation” (Kang 2001).  While Robinson (2007) argues that the nationalist 
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movement was merely an effort at internal regime change, he also supports Caprio’s (2010) 
argument that the demonstrations were no more than an independence movement.  The 
integration of the Korean independence movement and development of nationalism highlight the 
role of the Japanese ‘other’ within the construction of Korean ethno-national identity.  
In light of these views, the March 1st Movement is popularly considered the first large-
scale Korean nationalist movement (Caprio 2010; Ch’oe, Lee, and De Bary 2000; Robinson 
2007; Schmid 2002; Spector 2007).  Chung-Sik Lee (1965) notes that it was only after the March 
1st Movement that nationalism found value in Korea.  Yet even after March 1, 1919, the push for 
nationalist reform failed to take root on a large scale (Lee 1965; Wells 2002). 
The residue of the Hermit Kingdom government policies and Tonghak Rebellion 
remained in the Korean nationalist rhetoric, ensuring xenophobia as a prime construction of the 
movement (Lee 1965).  Korean nationalists were so concerned with eradicating the Japanese that 
it was the only item on the agenda (Spector 2007).  As Japanese annexation of Korea persisted, 
the nationalists encouraged the diaspora to wait until the homeland was liberated, for “without a 
nation … it was not possible to have a home” (Schmid 2002, p. 251).  In regards to the Koryo 
saram, various attributes of the homeland can both facilitate and obstruct connections with the 
diaspora.  Xenophobia and ethnocentricity remain prevalent in South Korean political and 
nationalist discourse, alienating even the Korean diaspora diaspora community.  South Korean 
xenophobia is manifest in the government’s “overtly and continuously announced … intention to 
the Korean diasporas that it would not repatriate its compatriots in [Central Asia]” (Oh 2007, pp. 
167-168).  Butler (2001, p.209) argues xenophobia caused “reprisals against expressions of 
diasporan (as opposed to patriotic) nationalism in the same countries that facilitate diasporan 
networking through accessible telecommunications technology.” 
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Despite Korean suzerainty and later annexation, the process of establishing Japan as the 
external ‘other’ had not spread universally throughout the peninsula, exacerbating the lack of 
solidarity among Koreans, even within the nationalist movement (Khan 2001; Lee 1965).  
Modern nationalism in Korea began as a movement against the Yi dynasty rather than in defense 
of the Korean nation and was a product of post-Japanese annexation (Lee 1965).  Following 
annexation, the Japanese became the essential ‘other’ for the nationalist movement to create 
Korean ethnic and national identity (Lee 1965; Park 2010; Wells 2002). 
During the height of the nationalist movement in Korea (1930s), there was a major effort 
to validate the nation through historic cultural accomplishments and precedence of political 
independence and unification (Ch’oe, Lee, and De Bary 2000).  The emergence of state 
nationalism required social roots, and it was this “complex search for new political ideas, a 
strengthened sense of national identity, and an examination of the Korean tradition itself” that 
agglomerated into modern Korean nationalism (Robinson 1986).  Nations are not intrinsically 
tied to state boundaries, yet nations maintain territoriality by the establishment of place-based 
identity, and place holds a significant role in national identity.  Although Koreans held social 
perceptions of place within the peninsula, the ideology of territorial sovereignty had not yet been 
introduced (Schmid 2002).  Thus, place-based identity maintains vitality within the nationalist 
discourse while simultaneously being non-nationalist. 
Korean nationalist leaders noted that “the people were not at a sufficiently high level of 
consciousness to join in a common national cause” (Wells 2002, p. 185).  During colonization, 
Japanese anthropologists highlighted ancient Korean kingdoms as sources of regional identity 
(i.e., Goguryeo (northern) v. Baekje and Silla (southern)), yet a cultural connection of unified 
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Korean identity rested solely on the Dan-gun myth (Caprio 2010).  Even the Korean language 
was not yet considered vital to the nation. 
Language plays a vital role in the construction of social identity, and is an indicator of a 
nation’s cultural unity, but normalization and unified standards of the Korean language were 
constructed in the 1930s, well into the Japanese coloniali period (Ch’oe et al. 2000; King 2010).  
The Korean alphabet, what is now known as hangul, was first created by King Sejong in 1443.  
During Joseon rule the elite classes sought to distinguish themselves by the continued usage of 
hanmun (Chinese characters used in Korean) as a type of class distinction of education.  What is 
now vital to one’s Korean-ness was not yet established as an essential attribute of the Korean 
nation (Schmid 2002).  The hangul script did not gain vitality as an ethnic identifier until the 
nationalist independence movement, to the point that Sin Ch’aeho “challenged the nationality of 
any Korean who did not [have command of the national script]” (ibid, p.68). 
In assessing the vital link between language and identity, Ross King (2010, p.173) claims 
that “‘script nationalism’ is one of the defining characteristics of modern Korean identity.”  
Despite this seeming homogenizer, northern provinces historically maintained distinct dialect 
and pronunciation within the Korean language, and while the nationalist debates of normalizing 
the Korean language ensued, the soon-to-be deported Koryo saram were estranged from the 
linguistic changes and developments of what remains as the most significant identifier of Korean 
nationalism and ethnicity (King 2010, p.146).  While the Koryo saram continued to speak 
Yukchin Korean in Far East Russia, adoption rates of the Russian language were high among the 
Koryo saram even prior to deportation.  After deportation the Koryo saram Korean linguistic 
identity was rapidly diminished due to forced Russian language learning and Korean language 
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education restrictions.  Loss of language is not merely a “simple depletion of communication 
tools,” but a diminishing of identity, culture, and tradition (Dadabaev 2013, p. 1043). 
The Koryo Saram within the “Homeland” History 
In the early twentieth century there were significant Korean populations in the United 
States, Mexico, Japan, and Manchuria, but the largest diaspora population was in the Russian Far 
East (Schmid 2002).  Initially, emigration was viewed as “cultural disinheritance” as fear of 
cultural disintegration or adulteration emanated throughout nationalist discourse and there was 
“supposed cultural frailty of anyone who crossed the border” (ibid, pp. 237-240).  Cultural 
assimilation caused a lack of Korean prominence in Manchuria and the Russian Far East, and 
maintenance of a “national essence” was encouraged beyond the peninsula (ibid, p. 239). 
Despite the break from territorial necessity in regards to national identity, geographic 
proximity to the peninsula was still regarded as a greater sense of ethnic belonging, and “space 
and identity were deemed isomorphic” (Schmid 2002, p.239); thus the Koryo saram were seen as 
less ‘Korean’ after their deportation.  Even historically, border porosity and distance from the 
capital was seen by the ruling class as a cultural dilution and political radicalism according to the 
Yi dynasty (Kim 2011, p.10).  This perception led to “social marginalization and political 
discrimination” because of peripheral geographic location from the capital (Kim 2011).  
According to nationalist discourse, “culture…was best rooted in the nation’s soil,” and the 
dichotomy of peninsular–diasporic Korean ethnicity has continued since its conception in the 
early twentieth century (Schmid 2002).  While detachment from the state allows for the 
“rethinking of nationness,” there exists a notion of inherent disconnect with culture and identity 
(Malkki 1995); according to hard-boiled Korean nationalists the outlook of the Koryo saram was 
“no longer thoroughly Korean” (Lee 1965, p. 161). 
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Korea changed in the extreme during the colonial and post-colonial period, and has 
changed even more since post-war division (Lee 1965).  The idea of the ‘nation’ transcends state 
borders, and both northern and southern Korean regimes claim to represent all Koreans (Schmid 
2002).  Korean regimes maintain language and territory as nationally necessary and those not 
belonging to the southern portion of the peninsula are stigmatized.  Korean history and national 
identity are still concerned with anti-colonial discourse and xenophobic tendencies that it are 
detrimental to post-colonial identity formation in South Korea and diaspora relations (ibid, 
p.268). 
Between establishment of the protectorate and annexation most leaders of the nationalist 
movement fled to China, Russia, and the United States, but despite their claims as the bastions of 
‘Korean-ness’, their ideologies, values, and beliefs were “Americanized, Russianized, or 
Sinocized,” and the nationalist movement lost its claim as custodians of the Korean culture, 
ethnicity, and nation (Lee 1965; Malkki 1995; Wells 2002).  Modern Korean nationalism was 
“born” after a reconstruction of history, an identity the Koryo saram did not help to create 
(Robinson 1986, p.49).  Koreans claim uniform ethnic identity, and Japan encouraged this to 
further its colonial purposes, yet the multi-dimensional construction of Korea as a homogeneous 
peninsula, intense regional differences show Korea should be viewed as “a peninsula of diversity 
rather than as a homogeneous entity” (Caprio 2010, p.316). 
 Despite Korea’s claimed national roots in antiquity, identity is not stagnant nor 
ubiquitous, but adaptive and adoptive.  The nationalist movements from the start of the twentieth 
century have sought to define what it means to be Korean.  By some qualifications the Koryo 
saram may be identified as ethnically Korean, but extended isolation from the initial and re-
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emerging nationalist movements proves too stark for South Korean efforts to substantiate the 
claim as the homeland for all Koreans, particularly the Koryo Saram. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
AN AGE OF DIASPORAS: CURRENT AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF SOUTH KOREA–
CENTRAL ASIAN RELATIONS AND THE ROLE OF THE KORYO SARAM 
In 1937 the entire population of nearly 200,000 ethnic Koreans was deported from the 
Russian Far East to the Central Asian Soviet republics of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.  Today 
approximately 700,000 ethnic Koreans within the former Soviet Union are one of the largest 
groups within the claimed South Korean diaspora community.  Due to socio-cultural 
marginalization within the “homeland” during the Joseon Period (1392-1910) and subsequent 
life in the Russian Far East, the Koryo saram established a distinct culture from peninsular 
Koreans (Schmid 2002; Lee 1965; Robinson 2010; Wells 2002).  Regardless of generations of 
socio-cultural, linguistic, and geopolitical separation, South Korea brands the Koryo saram as 
being a component of a broader Korean diaspora community.9  Assuming the role of ethnic 
homeland, the South Korean government has utilized the Koryo saram to enrich its footing 
within burgeoning energy economies of Central Asia.  Although South Korea assumes the role of 
homeland, a lack of repatriation, sense of belonging, and ethnic characteristics among the Koryo 
saram challenge this claim. 
 South Korea maintains ties with the Central Asian republics under the assumed role of 
the Koryo saram ethnic homeland, but inherently designating South Korea as “homeland” 
ascribes to frailties of the modern geopolitical nation-state dichotomy.  Following an historical 
overview of South Korea’s emergence as a global economic power, this work investigates the 
triangular relations between homeland, host-land, and diaspora group to examine South Korea’s 
                                                          
9 Other major groups considered as the South Korean diaspora community include Korean-Americans, Sakhalin 
Koreans, Zainichi (Koreans in Japan), and Joseon-jok (Koreans in China). 
 47 
current and future implications of cultural involvement with the Koryo saram and motives of 
economic relations with Central Asian host-lands. 
The South Korean Economic Miracle and the Emergence of “Global Korea” 
The Korean peninsula was considered the most valuable possession in the Japanese 
Empire, and the South Korean economic “miracle” is due in large part to modernization and 
industrialization of the peninsula during Japanese colonial rule (Cumings 1984).  Despite the 
cultural impact of Japanese social and political policies, Japan established Korean infrastructure 
and introduced the chaebol (Jp. Zaibatsu) economic model that is highly responsible for South 
Korean economic development.10 
Modern South Korean economic and political legitimacy focuses heavily on nationalist 
discourse.  Historiographic emphasis on the Korean nationalist movement is viewed by Kenneth 
Wells (2002) as a failure because the division of Korea into northern and southern regimes 
manifests vestiges of Japanese colonialism yet to be overthrown.  This is evident by continued 
government enforcement of legitimacy policies and strategies, which have “revived and recalled 
many colonial and cultural experiences” (Park 2010, p.86).  The boundary between northern 
(North) and southern (South) Korea is technically an inner-state boundary, and “it is thus 
possible to attain unification without contradicting the [nation-state] division system itself” 
(Wells 2002, p.195).  Wells’s (2002) argument provides valuable insight into diaspora return 
migration patterns and reflects the sense of the differentiation within the Korean ethnic group. 
Understanding the nation as constructed or imagined is paramount in reconsidering the 
nation-state, or national identity, as not being the only form of social identity considered in 
discussing diaspora groups (Wells 2002).  Nationalism is about power-seeking and Japanese 
                                                          
10 Pre-colonial Joseon land ownership policy was detrimental to the economy, and Japan reorganized land rights, 
built railroads, opened ports, and introduced modern industry to the peninsula (Cumings 1984, pp.11-12). 
 48 
colonial rule forced all social movements to form under the guise of nationalism; this guise 
removed the true nature of the nation and disallowed a united Korean identity to emerge (ibid, 
p.197).  As it did historically during the Joseon period and the emerging nationalist movement, 
factionalism remained as a major issue in national and diasporic identity.  After 1910, anti-
Japanese sentiment was the main symbol of Korean nationalism, and expressed a continued 
effort to assert national and ethnic unity in a residue of the colonial period (Robinson 1986).  
During colonization the Korean nationalist movement was preoccupied with issues of 
independence, leading to Korean cultural identity being (re)asserted to pre-colonial social norms.  
The Koryo saram left the peninsula under social and political duress (in the mid-19th century), 
and the resumption of Joseon era socio-cultural norms reinforces a major deterrent to the Koryo 
saram rejecting the “revival” of South Korean cultural identity. 
On August 15, 1945, the Korean peninsula was liberated from the Japanese Empire.  
Despite liberation, the historic homeland would not be reconstructed.  In order to facilitate the 
Japanese surrender on the peninsula at the conclusion of the Second World War (although other 
geopolitical issues were involved), the Korean peninsula was divided along the 38th north line of 
latitude by United Nations and Soviet delegation (Spector 2007).  In 1948, the Soviet-influenced 
northern Korean state established the communist regime of the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (DPRK), while the U.S.-backed southern Korea created a pseudo-democratic system 
within the Republic of Korea (ROK) (Park 2010; Ryang 2009; Schmid 2002).  Both northern and 
southern regimes in post-colonial Korea enacted nationalist rhetoric to validate their legitimacy 
as custodians of Korean national identity (Morris-Suzuki 2009; Pratt 2007; Ryang 2009; Schmid 
2002).  Post-World War II division of the Korean peninsula has complicated the formation of a 
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homeland, reinforcing Sonia Ryang’s (2009) argument that homelands cannot be viewed solely 
within the scope of the nation-state system. 
The situation in post-colonial Korea was so dire that staying put was more attractive to 
most overseas Koreans; detriments included a lack of basic life essentials, political persecution, 
and marginalization of returnees due to homeland claims of ethnic homogeneity (Caprio and Jin 
2009).  After liberation, North Korea carried out a successful socio-economic revolution, while 
South Korea “festered for five years through dissent, disorder, major rebellions in 1946 and 1948, 
and a significant guerilla movement in 1948 and 1949” (Cumings 1984, p.23).  South Korea was 
controlled by U.S.–backed landlords who were more concerned with their own “social privilege” 
than national economic growth, and therefore the country “entered a general crisis of legitimacy” 
(ibid).  Bruce Cumings (1984) notes that during the Korean War, North Korean occupation of the 
South brought about land reform in South Korea, and the legitimation crisis continued after the 
war.  Although Japanese colonialism catalyzed South Korea’s modernization, social and political 
turmoil impeded economic development. 
Post-war government policies during the 1960s-1980s were specifically designed to 
cultivate a national spirit (Park 2010).  In 1961, General Park Chung-Hee led a military coup, 
wrested power in South Korea and established a military dictatorship.  The Park regime 
highlighted national history to validate its legitimacy, claiming that “history … confirmed the 
teleology of capitalist modernity” (Park 2010).  Park’s regime – as well as ensuing 
administrations – intertwined South Korean economic goals with cultural vitality, utilizing each 
for the betterment of the other (Park 2010; Pratt 2007).  The military government viewed 
“culture as a legitimate means of social control,” and took great efforts to construct Korean 
history in a way that validated their regimes and promoted national unity (Pratt 2007, p.282).  
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Pratt (2007) notes that “every president from Park onwards has recognized the value of his 
nation’s culture to its – and his own – futures,” and all have focused significant political energy 
and funds into enacting national culture related policies, reifying culture through the government.  
Throughout the 1970s Park Chung-Hee’s administration sought to establish “self-determining 
historiography” to construct ancient history in order to “serve present imperatives” (Wells 2002, 
pp. 189-190).  For example, a resurgence in geomancy ensued, highlighting Mt. Baekdu as the 
birthplace of Dan-gun and the foundation of the Korean ethnos, “the locus of [the Korean] 
spirit,” and as a symbol of reunification (Schmid 2002, p. 275). 
Another vital component of South Korean nationalist discourse is the historical 
construction of the Korean peninsula as a unitary political entity since the time of “Unified Silla” 
(668-935).  Schmid (2002) argues that Korea, although it is commonly self-identified as a unified 
nation since 668 CE, was never truly an independent state before 1948, maintaining only “hollow 
sovereignty” throughout much of its history. 
 Modern South Korean national culture is based on the resurrection of Neo-Confucian 
traditions of the Yi dynasty (Robinson 1986).  The “backward” traditions that form the crux of 
modern Korean cultural and national identity were originally seen by the nationalist movement 
as detrimental to international involvement and social development.  According to Robinson 
(1986), “cultural schizophrenia” caused the vilifying of Korean tradition within the nationalist 
movement.  As the popular nationalist movement sought to eradicate “traditional” Korean 
culture – and thus the old Sino-centric identity – it was unable to establish a sense of cultural 
identity beyond anti-Japanese sentiment until post-war government policies reinstituted a 
constructed set of traditions. 
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During this time of national reconstruction Japan was again vilified as a colonial 
oppressor.  Anti-Japanese sentiment was reignited for its essential role in the original 
construction of Korean nationalism and has shaped the reconstructed nationalism of South Korea.  
Such sentiments were strong during the renationalizing process and, until at least 1996, were 
seen by the government as necessary to purge the country of colonial residue (Park 2010).  
Throughout the reconstruction of nationalism in post-war South Korea, the external “other” was 
portrayed as a military threat in order to validate President Park’s military coup, but also in large 
part to restore the roots of Joseon as the cultural basis for Korean identity and national 
homogeneity.  The Park regime set out to reintroduce Neo-Confucian ideals of loyalty and filial 
piety on an ethno-national scale, although they were originally opposed by the early nationalist 
movement – noted as the cause of Joseon failure (Park 2010).  Cultural heritage and identity 
have been utilized by the South Korean state to construct a national culture in order to inspire a 
sense of nationhood and belonging (Park 2010).  Establishing national identity involves 
determining a dichotomy of belonging (Diener 2002).  South Korea utilizes this idea in a 
continual effort to self-identify within the globalizing world, as well as legitimize the state and 
government as the true custodian of the Korean nation (Robinson 1986). 
During the 1960s and 1970s, South Korea moved from the periphery of the Northeast 
Asian regional economy and began to garner strong enough economic presence to vie for 
political legitimacy on the peninsula and global economy.  President Park Chung Hee formed a 
strong central government and acquired “stability amid rapid economic and social change” 
(Cumings 1984, pp. 28-33).  The 1970s saw economic growth due to strong central government 
and familial structured industrial conglomerates (chaebol) (Auerbach, Kim, and Sompornserm 
2011).  During the Sygman Rhee administration (1948-1960) and well into the 1980s, “South 
 52 
Korea was a dictatorship where the standard of living was little higher, and may indeed have 
been lower, than it was in [North Korea]” (Morris-Suzuki 2009, p. 57).  During the Park Chung 
Hee administration (1962-1979) “the geopolitical lines…were thus fixed,” and the Japanese 
economic model was reintroduced to South Korea (Cumings 1984, p. 20). 
 East Asian countries were at “the center of world economic dynamism” in the 1970s and 
1980s, and that included both Koreas (Cumings 1984).  The East Asian economic boom was 
encouraged by export-led growth, but before President Park took power South Korea’s economy 
was based on import substitution focusing on textile and cement industry, as well as agriculture 
(ibid).  In the mid-1960s free export zones (FEZ) were established in Korea, attracting major 
international investment and South Korea began to emerge in the global economy via export-led 
development.  Initially South Korean industry focused on textile export, but the Park regime 
emphasized more heavy industry based on exporting iron and steel, ships, and automobiles, as 
well as electronics (ibid). 11  When Park took office in 1962 South Korea was still struggling to 
overcome failed post-war reconstruction efforts with a per capita gross domestic product (GDP) 
of 103.57 USD, but by his death in 1979 boasted a 1,857.82 GDP per capita (Cumings 1984; 
Hwang 2012).  South Korea’s rapid economic growth increased industrialization and 
modernization, and the 1988 Seoul Olympics was a major catalyst in providing the world a new 
view of South Korea as a modernized state in the global economic arena (Spector 2007). 
Throughout the 1970s Park Chung Hee’s regime sought to establish South Korea as the 
custodian of the entire Korean nation, society, and culture by utilizing the discourse of “self-
determining historiography” to construct history to “serve present imperatives” (Wells 2002, pp. 
189-190).  President Chun Doo Hwan (1981-1988) furthered the work of the Park regime, 
                                                          
11 President Park even noted in 1972 that “steel = national power” (Cumings 1984, p32). 
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including the incorporation of a national culture clause into the South Korean constitution – 
manifesting state-sponsored “shaping” of national culture.  According to Park (2010, p. 85), the 
efforts of the Chun administration established its legitimacy and instilled “national pride in 
Korean traditions, language, and history.”  Despite these efforts, South Korean interaction with 
the Koryo saram was negligible due to political circumstances surrounding the Soviet Union and 
South Korea (ibid). 
During the Kim Young-sam administration (1993-1998), chaebols were encouraged by 
liberalization of short-term finance, which were supported by the “government’s globalization 
priority,” serving economic and political function simultaneously (Willett 2009, p. 63).  In 
response to the 1997-1998 financial crisis, South Korean banks were permitted by the 
government to initiate and expand overseas investments and operations.  In the mid-1990s 
chaebols controlled over half of all South Korean merchant banks, and South Korea’s neoliberal 
response – instigated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan and political reform 
demands – to the Asian economic crisis increased bank operations in overseas markets, 
compensating for domestic debts (Auerbach, Kim, and Sompornserm 2011). 
 A direct result of Kim Young-sam’s segyehwa (globalization) discourse included the 
expansion of South Korean popular culture beyond the bounds of the state, particularly among 
the diaspora community.  The Hallyu (Korean Wave) is a concerted effort to generate cultural 
capital, particularly abroad, in light of the Asian economic crisis during the late 1990s.  
According to Eun-Young Jung (2009) Hallyu popularity is due to hybridization of Western 
culture and Korean tradition, promoting transnationalism and globalization.  Despite “possible 
erosion of their cultural particularity” amidst such global influence, the ‘Korean wave’ has 
thrived due to adaptations to external influences (Shim 2006, p.38; see also Jung 2009).  Park 
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(2010, p. 159) considers Hallyu a “logical outgrowth of Korea’s growing economic status and 
power in Asian geopolitics and the global arena” promulgated among the ethnic diaspora 
community primarily to expand South Korea’s economic markets.  South Korean popular culture 
generates cultural capital worldwide, and is seen as vital to expanding South Korea’s export-led 
economic growth.  South Korea utilizes its cultural popularity as economic soft power to 
highlight homeland/diaspora relations with the Koryo saram and influence economic 
negotiations within Central Asian states (Fumagalli 2012; Jung 2009; Shim 2006).  Global 
economic prominence and nation-building projects seek to reinforce South Korea’s ethno-
cultural claim and geo-political legitimacy as the Koryo saram homeland. 
Triangular Relations: South Korea, the Koryo Saram, and Central Asian States 
 Nationalism seeks rootedness in “fixed territory” that is assigned meaning by the nation 
or “nationalizing community” (Diener 2002).  South Korea seeks political legitimacy as 
progenitor of Korean nationhood by claiming the role of homeland for the Koryo saram – a pre-
division detached group.  According to Alexander C. Diener (ibid, pp.633-634), “the emotional 
bond between the population targeted for nationalization and the homeland that will serve as 
spatial context for that nation” seeks to imply a sense of place permanence among kinsfolk.  In 
South Korea, national identity is centered on the idea of a “one-blood nation,” highlighting 
questions of dual citizenship and nationality amidst traditions of homogeneity and belonging on 
the peninsula (Chung and Kim 2012).  Despite implications of South Korea’s stance as the 
assumed homeland of all Koreans, the Overseas Korean Foundation Act (OKA) and senses of 
belonging among the Koryo saram challenge the ethnic identity and belonging of the diaspora 
group in South Korean ethnicity.  Despite these issues, South Korean relations with Central 
Asian states remain vital to regional and state economies. 
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During the height of the nationalist movement in Korea (1930s), there was a major effort 
to validate the nation through historic cultural accomplishments and precedence of political 
independence (Ch’oe, Lee, and De Bary 2000).  The emergence of state nationalism maintains 
social roots, and it was this “complex search for new political ideas, a strengthened sense of 
national identity, and an examination of the Korean tradition itself” that agglomerated into 
modern Korean nationalism (Robinson 1986, p. 36).  Nations are not intrinsically tied to state 
boundaries, yet nations maintain territoriality by the establishment of place-based identity, and 
‘place’ holds a significant role in national identity (Kim 2011, p. 13; Schmid 2002, p. 199).  
Although Koreans held social perceptions of place within the peninsula, the ideology of 
territorial sovereignty had not yet been introduced (Schmid 2002).  Thus, place-based identity 
maintains vitality within the nationalist discourse while simultaneously being non-nationalist.  
Nation-building revolves around constructed histories, and Korean nationalist history seeks to 
validate Korean ethnic and national identity (ibid, p.188).  The varied historical experience of the 
Koryo saram highlights the necessity of expanding the historical scope of the national history 
beyond the peninsula; the history of the Korean nation should not be confused with the Korean 
state history, and analysis of the Koryo saram must transcend traditional views and expand 
beyond “such temporal phenomena as states” (Schmid 2002, p. 190). 
The phenomenon of “pluralistic nationalism” is vital to discussions surrounding diaspora, 
especially in reference to the Koryo saram.  The historic homeland of the Koryo saram was a 
unified dynastic Korean peninsula.  The Korean peninsula is divided politically and increasingly 
ethno-culturally between North and South; the Central Asian states, formed after the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union, are currently undertaking nationalization efforts.  According to Cohen (1996) 
compulsory means tend to alienate the diaspora group, but this does not seem to be the case 
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regarding the Koryo saram.  According to my surveys, as well as Khan (2013) and Oh (2007) 
most of the Koryo saram maintain a sense of belonging, consider themselves full citizens, and 
have experienced little, if any, persecution in Uzbekistan. 
The homeland policies can facilitate and obstruct connections with the diaspora.  Butler 
(2001, p. 209) highlights xenophobia as causing “reprisals against expressions of diasporan (as 
opposed to patriotic) nationalism in the same countries that facilitate diasporan networking 
through accessible telecommunications technology.”  South Korean state-led ethnocentrism 
discourages a sense of belonging among the diaspora community (Kim 2012).  Despite the 
assumed role of the South Korean state as the ethnic homeland, the diaspora group’s “construct 
of the homeland is essential” for the creation of diasporic identity (Butler 2001, p. 204), although 
not all groups labeled as diasporas view themselves as such (Brubaker 2005).   
A resounding majority of the Koryo saram view their host-lands as homeland, despite an 
increase in “ethnic culture and ethnic history awareness” (Diener 2006, pp. 207-209).  Natsuko 
Oka (2001) and Tae Hyeon Back (2001) both note migrations among the Koryo saram have seen 
a return to the Russian Far East Maritime region, although it must be noted that any type of 
international migration is minimal.  Despite diaspora conception and establishment of identity 
partially on common history of their ethnic society and culture (Shuval 2000), it is clear that the 
multi-generational feature amended to identify diasporas is a two-edged sword as sense of 
belonging shifts from historic homeland to host-land.  Ryang (1997) notes that as time within the 
host-land increases, repatriation tendencies decrease and naturalization becomes more prevalent. 
In recent decades, a major issue regarding South Korean ethnicity has revolved around 
the dual citizenship debate (Kim 2013).  The major point of South Korea’s dual citizenship 
debate (2010) was deciding who belonged, or, who possessed proper ‘Korean-ness’ (Kim 
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2013).12  Instigated during the Asian economic crisis, the 1997 OKA was the first legislation to 
acknowledge Koreans outside the peninsula as belonging to the Korean nation, but citizenship 
was only extended to Koreans that could trace paternal ancestry to the South Korean state (Kim 
2013; Park and Chang 2005).  This exclusion of most of the diaspora community including the 
Koryo saram created a “(dis)juncture and tension between national and ethnic identities… in a 
highly globalized world” (Park and Chang 2005, pp.2-3).13  While the OKA was later amended 
to include all Koreans regardless of gender descent, blood-lineage and former South Korean 
citizenship was still required to legitimize Korean-ness (Kim 2013; Park and Chang 2005).  In an 
effort to validate the OKA and legitimize the South Korean government, officials argued that 
although the state was not formally established until 1948, it should be considered the legitimate 
heir of the provisional government formed during Japanese occupation, and therefore umbrella 
the entire Korean diaspora community as former citizens of South Korea (Park and Chang 2005).   
Emphasis on South Korean citizenship by the OKA disregards ethnic Koreans who were 
detached from the homeland before 1948, including northern Koreans (Kim 2013).  While South 
Korean politicians have emphasized ethnic, cultural, and class homogeneity within South Korea 
– which the OKA blatantly refutes – many citizens viewed this as an affront to Korean identity, 
claiming legislation emphasized class-based ethnicity and favored overseas Koreans deemed 
useful to revitalizing and restructuring the South Korean economy (Kim 2013). 
Amendments to the OKA in 1999 and 2003 emphasized repatriation and offered dual 
citizenship to the perceived wealthier, skilled Korean-Americans in an effort to attract 
investment, while excluding citizenship – and de jure ethnic belonging – to perceived unskilled 
                                                          
12 Nora Hui-Jung Kim (2013) uses ethnicity and citizenship synonymously within her work. 
13 Emphasis on former South Korean state citizenship would eliminate large amount of Joseon-jok, Zainichi, and 
even some Korean-Americans that migrated before and during Japanese occupation (1910-1945), before the 
establishment of the South Korean state (1948). 
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laborers of Korean descent from China and the former Soviet Union (Kim 2013; Park and Chang 
2005).  These Korean diaspora groups were not seen as second-class citizens, but were not even 
considered as ethnically Korean by the class- and ethnicity-based social structure that was 
constructed during the economic crisis.  South Korean claims of ethnic homogeneity and ethnic 
unity reinforce ethnocentricity (Kim 2013).  Chung and Kim (2012) note that both Joseonjok and 
the Koryo saram resemble native Koreans, but highlight and reinforce ethnic foreign-ness and 
are therefore regarded as non-Korean.  State-led ethnocentrism enforces a lack of belonging of 
the diaspora community (Kim 2012).14  Though South Korea rejects certain diaspora groups as 
‘Korean’, the government claims “homeland” status for geopolitical and economic objectives, 
and “the homeland’s centripetal power” regarding return and identity of diasporas goes 
unquestioned in classical diaspora studies and geopolitical discourse (Park and Chang 2005, pp. 
14-15). 
The debate regarding class-based ethnic belonging and the OKA expand the gap between 
national and ethnic identity relating to the legitimacy of the nation-state and the effort “to build 
large-scale, de-territorialized, pan-national communities” (Kim 2013, p. 14; see also Park and 
Chang 2005).  The OKA also highlights Korean nationality, ethnicity, and community as 
constructed and imagined.  The 1997 financial crisis was the turning point in South Korean 
interest in its diaspora community, especially those in Central Asia, as the South Korean 
economy sought new markets for expansion (Fumagalli 2012; Kim 2013). 
Economic transitions in South Korea coincided with Soviet policies of perestroika and 
glasnost, which increased political interactions between both countries.  Initial Soviet-South 
                                                          
14 These Korean diasporas were not seen as second-class citizens, but not even citizens to any degree; this was 
exacerbated by dual citizenship being extended to non-ethnic Koreans in a 2005 amendment to the OKA.  The OKA 
was further amended in 2010, and although it maintained stringent class-based ethnicity laws, it allowed citizenship 
to be reclaimed by affluent ethnic Koreans who rescinded/declined citizenship in 2005 (Kim 2013, pp. 15-16). 
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Korean interactions were economic in nature.  For both the Soviet Union and South Korea, the 
“most immediate concern … was an economic one,” and political interaction hinged on – as well 
as accelerated – economic endeavors, and these economic ties carried over into post-Soviet 
Central Asian relations with South Korea (Bowers 1992, pp.22-31).  The fractured collapse of 
the Soviet Union, and ensuing political relations with Central Asian republics provided South 
Korea with access to formerly inaccessible markets (Fumagalli 2012). 
Initiated by former President Lee Myung-bak (2009–2013), expansions of economic 
interaction during the “New Asia Initiative” formed “energy Silk Road diplomacy” to further 
South Korea’s economic and energy goals in Central Asia (Calder and Kim 2008; Fumagalli 
2012).  The greatest economic concern for South Korea is energy availability and access, and the 
Central Asian republics are major producers (Calder and Kim 2008).  South Korea’s “lack of 
domestic energy sources” necessitates dependence on foreign energy, particularly oil from the 
Middle East (75%); the ROK considers Central Asia a valuable partner in diversifying its energy 
supplier needs (ibid, p. 6).  Not only are oil and natural gas valuable to South Korea, but there 
are “substantial uranium reserves” which would prove most valuable to a country that is 40% 
reliant on nuclear energy (Calder and Kim 2009; Hwang 2012).  Central Asian energy provide 
South Korea with longer-term energy solutions that are more stable than their current reliance on 
Middle East energy supplies (Calder and Kim 2009). 
Central Asian-South Korean economic partnerships are symbiotic.  While Central Asian 
states maintain a geo-politically strategic location and large quantities of natural resources, their 
emerging economies are complementary to South Korea’s business and manufacturing 
conglomerates (chaebols).  Chaebols are vital to South Korea-Central Asia relations.  Major 
issues surround access and availability to Central Asian energy resources: production and 
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exploration, transportation and distribution, and geopolitical location and situation of the region.  
Chaebol conglomerates provide comprehensive services to global markets that fit well within 
Central Asian economic goals (Calder and Kim 2008; Calder and Kim 2009; Fumagalli 2012; 
Hwang 2012).  The South Korean chaebol system has the unique ability to supply and finance 
infrastructure as well as “intellectual services” (Calder and Kim 2008, p. 8).  Central Asian 
republics have benefited from South Korean investment projects in secondary education, 
manufacturing, information technology, construction, and medicine and medical facilities 
(Calder 2012).   
Kazakhstan holds the second largest Koryo saram population (over 100,000), and is the 
region’s largest oil producer (Calder and Kim 2009).  Since establishing economic ties, South 
Korean involvement in Kazakhstan has steadily grown, especially in banking (Hwang 2012).  
South Korea’s neoliberal response to the economic crisis (1997) increased bank operations in 
overseas markets, and the expanded operations were able to compensate for domestic debts 
(Auerbach, Kim, and Sompornserm 2011).  Uzbekistan is home to the fourth largest Korean 
diaspora population in the world (around 200,000), and is a major natural gas producer (Calder 
and Kim 2009; Hwang 2012).  Political ties were established between South Korea and 
Uzbekistan in the early 1990s and their economic engagement between the two countries is now 
the largest in the region.  South Korea almost immediately became the largest foreign investor in 
Uzbekistan (Hwang 2012). 
Central Asian governments are open to South Korean involvement in regional economies 
because of South Korea’s history of government controlled economy (Cumings 1984; Hwang 
2012; Willett 2009).  South Korea’s history of intense government involvement in the economy 
is also a beacon to Central Asia’s totalitarian regimes.  Authoritarian regimes in the region look 
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to South Korea’s state-led economic growth as a model of economic development, and the 
chaebol provide comprehensive service to global markets without requiring political reform as 
compensation for economic support (Auerbach, Kim, and Sompornserm 2011; Calder and Kim 
2009; Fumagalli 2012; Hwang 2012).   This is an attractive model for Central Asia because of 
“[South Korean] reluctance to meddle in the countries’ domestic affairs” (Fumagalli 2012, 
pp.87-88).  Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, especially, utilize their economic relations with South 
Korea “to increase their leverage with their powerful neighbors, without having to go as far as 
creating a strategic alliance” (Hwang 2012, p. 2).  Although South Korean energy diversification 
was the main draw, Central Asian republics have benefitted from projects in education, 
manufacturing, information technology, construction, and medicine and medical facilities 
(Calder and Kim 2008; Fumagalli 2012; Hwang 2012).  This expansion of economic ties has 
developed from the “energy Silk Road diplomacy” initiated by former President Lee Myung-bak, 
and have been furthered by current President Park Geun-hye (2013-present) (Calder and Kim 
2008).   
Central Asian states are “promising markets for cost-effective Korean manufacturers” 
(Calder and Kim 2009, p. 50).  While the Koryo saram populations in Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan are negligible, South Korea has utilized its soft power to expand its economic 
foothold in the region (Hwang 2012).  Economic interest in these three Central Asian republics 
revolves around their ferrous metals, uranium, and oil and natural gas reserves.  According to 
Calder and Kim (2009), “Korea … lacks America’s hard power yet arguably wields substantial 
soft power owing to cultural ties, the attractiveness of the Korean economic model, and Korea’s 
role as a cost-effective supplier of both consumer and capital goods.”  Korea maintains a 
marketplace role in Central Asia’s economic mindset.  Although South Korea lacks the hard 
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power of other major players in the region, it claims cultural ties via the Koryo saram diaspora 
group (Calder and Kim 2008). 
Calder and Kim (2009, pp. 66-70) note that the Koryo saram are a “catalyst for deeper 
ties” between the Central Asian states and South Korea.  South Korean non-government 
organizations (NGOs) have established centers to teach the Korean language, art, history, and 
culture to the Koryo saram populations throughout the region, and South Korea seeks to utilize 
this thin ethnic tie to establish and maintain strong political and economic relations for future 
energy stability (Calder and Kim 2008).  South Korean involvement in “[Central Asia] has been 
primarily economic” in efforts to assert itself in the global economic market and act as a bridge 
between developed and developing countries (Fumagalli 2012; Hwang 2012; Park and Chang 
2005).  South Korea claims that social and cultural interactions with the Koryo saram are the 
main drivers behind involvement in the region, but such “revival” efforts are superficial at best; 
the Central Asian economies are the major attraction. 
Cultural “Revival” of the Koryo saram 
Soviet nationality policies were constructed and enacted in order to facilitate 
modernization throughout the Soviet Union, particularly among the Central and Eastern Asian 
regions (Dadabaev 2013).  These policies proved to be the basis of nationalist rhetoric within the 
independent Central Asian republics since their independence in 1991, although it can be argued 
that during the Soviet Union, citizens developed a “Soviet ethnicity.”  Korenizatsiya policies 
aimed to “liberate” ethnic groups and reify a Soviet ethnicity, but contrarily increased 
“importance of the so-called ‘objective’ markers defining a nation such as a local language, 
territory, common descent (kinship) and common culture” among minority groups (ibid).  
Implementation and enforcement of korenizatsiya was extinguished in the 1930s, but not after 
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seeds of ethnic identity had been planted in groups across the Soviet Union in a way that 
impacted everyday social life. 
As discussed, South Korea has invested heavily in the Central Asian energy economy.  
South Korea has established long-term contracts with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and it is clear 
that Central Asia-South Korea relations are products of “mutual economic benefit” (Calder and 
Kim 2009; Hwang 2012).  The energy Silk Road was initiated by President Lee Myung-bak’s 
vision and policies for a “Global Korea” (Hwang 2012).  South Korean government and non-
government organizations have established centers to teach the Korean language, history, and 
culture to the Koryo saram throughout the region and seek to utilize cultural ties to establish and 
maintain economic relations for future energy stability. Although South Korea claims that the 
Koryo saram diaspora group is the main driver of interest and involvement in the region, the 
Central Asian economies are the major attraction. 
Unlike other states involved in Central Asia, South Korea does not require political 
reform as compensation for economic involvement, and maintains a unique economic model.  
The main reason for involvement in Central Asia is economic, and South Korea exploits the 
nation-state system to assume the role as the Koryo saram homeland (Hwang 2012).  South 
Korean involvement in the overseas Korean population is “bound up in vested economic 
interests,” highlighting issues of “the permeability and fluidity of ethnic/national membership” 
and the role of the homeland in diaspora identity and the peninsula’s legitimacy as a homeland 
for the Korean diaspora community (Park and Chang 2005, pp. 10, 15). 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, South Korea has expanded cultural activities in the 
region in an effort to further establish ties with the Koryo saram and, by extension, Central Asian 
states (Calder and Kim 2009).  Such cultural activities include educational centers, language 
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courses, traditional Korean art, culture, and history classes, and cultural events.  The Korean 
diaspora, including the Koryo saram, impact trade and investment flows and labor markets in the 
homeland and host-lands (Choi 2003).  Globalization and global economic markets are 
transforming many diasporas into trade and investment diasporas.  “Trade and investment have a 
long history of interrelationship with diasporas” and greatly impact relations between homelands 
and host-lands; the social and economic networks established by diasporas are transnational 
(Choi 2003).  While Korean-Americans have long desired dual-citizenship (Kim 2013), among 
the Koryo saram it has been a non-issue and research shows that “Central Asian Koreans are 
intent on remaining in [Central Asia] and vesting themselves in [its] multinational future” 
(Diener 2009, p. 477).   
According to surveys distributed among the Koryo saram in Uzbekistan,15 most consider 
the Korean peninsula as the ethnic homeland for Koreans, although they do not consider North or 
South Korea to be their homeland.16  In regards to repatriation to the homeland or the myth of 
return, 40% of those surveyed indicated they would definitely leave Uzbekistan if they had the 
opportunity, although those respondents would migrate to Russia or the United States rather than 
South Korea.  While 20% who would “consider leaving” designated South Korea as a potential 
destination, along with Russia, the United States, or any other Western country, the ethnic 
homeland or even a prominent ethnic community does not draw potential migrants.  The most 
valuable “qualifying factors in selecting a new country in which to live” are economic 
opportunity (7 respondents) and multi-culturalism/multi-nationalism (3 respondents).  While 
South Korea maintains high economic opportunity, the desire for multi-culturalism and multi-
                                                          
15 My pilot study was a questionnaire distributed to ten (10) ethnic Koreans living in Uzbekistan that self-identify as 
Koryo saram (see Appendix 1). 
16 One-hundred percent (100%) of survey respondents designated either place of birth or current country of 
residence as their homeland (all were born in Uzbekistan, Russian, or the Soviet Union). 
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nationalism maintains the highest draw of repatriation or return migration due to ethno-centrism, 
xenophobia, and mono-culturalism.  Although ethnic ties between South Korea and this 
component of its diaspora have clearly strengthened since the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
interactions between the “homeland” and the Koryo saram should not be considered as an ethnic 
or cultural revival. 
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CHATPER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
The horizontal organization of the world by overlapping interactions is creating diaspora 
communities based solely on interest rather than place, but place is intrinsically tied to diaspora, 
and diaspora to place (Cohen 1996; Brinkerhoff 2009).  The future of diaspora as a discourse is 
expanding because the usage of the term ‘diaspora’ is being diluted (Cohen 1996).  Despite its 
growing usage, ‘diaspora’ remains an undefined term, relying on those who claim it as their 
identity to define its parameters.  Surely “the universalization of diaspora, paradoxically, means 
the disappearance of diaspora” (Brubaker 2005, p.3), or at least the value it holds as an indicator 
of a dispersed people with a desire to return to a former homeland.  Consequently, it is the 
adulteration of the terminology that will be a catalyst for diaspora studies to stretch beyond 
merely historic or case specific studies in the future. 
As the discourse surrounding diaspora studies expands, Brubaker (2005, p.8) proffers the 
idea of the “age of diaspora” succeeding the age of the Westphalian nation-state.  Certainly 
within the globalized world diasporas are becoming vital, and rather powerful, players in 
political and economic realms (Butler 2001, p.211) – as evidenced by the Korean diaspora 
community – but diaspora communities cannot be viewed as inified actors.  Some diaspora 
groups are seeking to find a place for themselves in their communities, cities, and states, while 
others – along with their host-land and ethnic homeland – balance their relationships for 
economic and political gain. 
 Multi-generational separation from an historical homeland and subsequent development 
of a distinguishable ethno-cultural identity have resulted in a significant break between the 
Koryo saram and South Koreans.  The Koryo saram are considered ethnically Korean by the 
South Korean government, although the extent of their “Korean-ness” should be scrutinized in an 
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effort to understand their identity.  The Koryo saram see their Central Asian host-land as a new 
homeland (Diener 2009).  While a lack of desire to return to South Korea does not negate ethnic 
belonging, it does question homeland validity and diasporic identity.  While it is clear that the 
Koryo saram do not consider South Korea as an historic homeland, political and economic 
relations between South Korea and Central Asian republics indicate the vitality of the Koryo 
saram in South Korea’s efforts to establish political legitimacy and economic vitality in the 
globalizing world. 
 Park and Chang (2005) question the Korean peninsula’s utility as a homeland for the 
Korean diaspora community in regards to unification and return migration, while Calder and 
Kim (2008; 2009) consider the role of Central Asia as the key to reunification of the homeland.  
If reunification were a result, it would not be due to political endeavors, but South Korea’s desire 
for a cheaper, more efficient overland oil pipeline from Central Asia.  Despite Calder and Kim’s 
(2008; 2009) optimistic outlook on potential reconciliation, a major argument by South Korean 
reunification activists was that the OKA overlooked ethnic divides between North and South 
Koreans, bounding Korean-ness while not “[embracing] our own people” (Kim 2013, p. 11).  
Implications of the Koryo saram’s potential impact of North-South relations on the Korean 
peninsula have only begun to be discussed by scholars.   
As Butler (2001) notes, the identity of a diaspora group partially stems from the self-
awareness that comes as the group discovers the existence of its place within the greater diaspora 
community.  Shim and Khan (2013) postulate a distinction among different “Koryo sarams,” as 
groups have acculturated to life within various Central Asian states factions of the formerly 
collective diaspora have developed separate diasporic consciousness. 
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Future identity formation of the Koryo saram may also provide a look into what is to 
become of adaptive diasporas.  Like the formation of any culture and society throughout history, 
diasporic identity evolves over time and is never stagnant (Butler 2001; Goetze 1998; Malkki 
1995).  By definition, diasporas seek to maintain “a collective memory, vision, or myth about 
their original homeland – its physical location, history, and achievements” (Safran 1991, p. 83).  
Ascribing to this mythologized concept allows the diaspora to imagine an ideal homeland to 
which current and future generations may look in order to make assimilation and acculturation 
difficulties more tolerable (Safran 1991).  Yet, diasporas have been subject to a “wax and wane 
in diasporism” (Clifford 1994, p. 306).  The term ‘diaspora’ cannot merely be defined or 
designated by a particular group, but fluctuates and is manipulated (Goetze 1998). 
This research has revealed that the multi-generational attribute of diasporas is a double-
edged sword.  In the case of the Koryo saram, Jin (2007) articulates an adaptive identity 
following removal from the Far East.  Since Central Asian states gained independence in 1991, 
the Koryo saram have become more aware of themselves as a distinct socio-cultural element 
within the wider Korean ethnic community, although they maintain the idea that they belong in 
their respective states of citizenship rather than South Korea.  Given such circumstances, are the 
Koryo saram still a diaspora?  They meet diasporic criteria, yet predominately maintain the 
notion of respective republics as homeland. 
While multiplicity of host-land complicates issues of diasporic identity formation, the 
existence of two nation-states vying for legitimacy as the ethnic homeland convolutes issues of 
territoriality and belonging among the Koryo saram.  In order to establish political legitimacy 
South Korea maintains ties with the Central Asian republics under the assumed role of ethnic 
homeland of the Koryo saram, but designating South Korea as a primordial homeland points to 
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frailties of modern geopolitical dichotomies of nation-states as exclusive containers of culture 
and nationality.  Discussing identity formation of the Koryo saram may illuminate identity 
construction of adaptive diasporas, potentially creating a new category of liminal diasporism. 
The Koryo saram have established territorial identity within various Central Asian states, 
and no longer maintain myths of “homeland” return.  The absence of this vital diasporic 
characteristic suspends the Koryo saram in a state of “in between-ness,” or liminality.17  
“Liminality is intended to describe a state of being ‘beyond usual categories’ and, as such forms 
a category itself,” or threshold category (Balduk 2008, p. vii).  While diasporas are structurally 
liminal due to characteristics of transnationality – being “between” states, borders, and cultures – 
the Koryo saram’s diasporism is liminal. 
Balduk (2008, p. 7) states that “liminal people are becoming better; they achieve a new 
‘essence’ or ‘nature’,” and that “liminality implies that such a passage is irreversible.”  While 
Clifford (1994, p. 306) indicates groups “wax and wane in diasporism,” the Koryo saram have 
maintained senses of belonging in places beyond the assumed South Korean “homeland” for 
multiple generations.  Describing the Koryo saram diasporic identity as liminal designates they 
no longer maintain South Korea as a desired “homeland,” nor continue to construct a myth of 
return, if there ever was such sentiment.  Home-towns of the Koryo saram in Central Asian host-
lands have become homelands constructed as “liminal space” (Balduk 2008, p. 8).  Liminality 
removes a group from attachment to place, and people begin to “believe places used to play a 
role” in identity construction (ibid, p. 21).  The physical deportation of the Koryo saram acted as 
a territorial passage, and the liminal spaces have transitioned into places of meaning and identity, 
                                                          
17 The theory of liminality comes from Arnold Van Gennep’s (1909) works concerning social and personal rights of 
passage.  My usage of the terminology stems from Victor Turner’s (1967, 1969) and Rob Shields’ (1991) expansion 
of the term into geographic theory. 
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reconstructing Central Asia as a place of identity for the Koryo saram, while South Korea no 
longer incites a myth of return. 
In liminal, or threshold, spaces boundaries are indistinct (Balduk 2008), not only in the 
physical sense, but in the psycho-social realm as well.  While the Koryo saram are labeled as 
ethnically Korean, they possess minimal attributes of ‘Korean-ness’ beyond physical features, 
and are more socially and ethnically akin to their fellow citizens in various Central Asian 
republics.  While blood-relations may beckon to the “homeland” that kinship is irrefutable, 
socio-cultural boundaries are prominent between the Koryo saram and South Koreans.  South 
Korea’s “imagined community” (Anderson 1991) has created a sense of togetherness so 
entrenched in nationalism and territoriality of the nation-state, and the Koryo saram no longer 
belong.  Simultaneously, various Central Asian republics have been carrying out respective 
nation-building endeavors since independence from the Soviet Union.  In an effort to establish 
territorial and state legitimacy, each republic has sought to distinguish its ethnicity as the 
dominant nationality and the Koryo saram could be considered an internal ‘other’ within a 
perceived homeland.   “The more or less permanent nature of the in between-ness – or at least its 
undetermined duration” (Balduk 2008, p.32) suggests that the Koryo saram are a diaspora 
without a homeland. 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 1:  
Questionnaire distributed to 10 ethnic Koreans in Uzbekistan  
who self-identify as Koryo saram. 
 
Your age: __________                                              Your gender: __________ 
Your place of birth: __________                              Your occupation: __________ 
The country in which you live: __________            How long you’ve lived there: __________ 
Your native language: __________                          Language you use most at work: __________ 
Your nationality: __________                                  Your ethnicity: __________ 
Your father’s nationality: __________                     Your mother’s nationality: __________ 
Your religious affiliation (if any): __________ 
 
Rate the following factors according to their importance to your personal identity: 
(1= very important, 2= important, 3= somewhat important, 4= a little important, 5=unimportant) 
 Living in your town or region…………………………...…...1     2     3     4     5 
  
Living in your current country of residence.............................1     2     3     4     5 
  
Living in a former country (if applicable)..….………………1     2     3     4     5  
(please specify: ____________________ ) 
  
Your nationality……………………………...........................1     2     3     4     5 
  
Your native language………………………...........................1     2     3     4     5 
  
Your religious affiliation…………………………………….1     2     3     4     5 
  
Other (please write: ___________________)………….……1     2     3     4     5 
 
Please rate how strongly you identify with the following groups of people:  
(1= completely, 2= usually, 3=generally, 4= somewhat, 5= not at all) 
 People of your nationality living in your current country……1     2     3     4     5 
  
People of all nationalities living in your current country...…...1     2     3     4     5 
  
People of your nationality living in Central Asia..…………...1     2     3     4     5 
  
People of all nationalities living in Central Asia…..………....1     2     3     4     5 
  
People of your nationality living in South Korea………….…1     2     3     4     5 
  
People of all nationalities living in South Korea………..........1     2     3     4     5 
  
People of your nationality living in North Korea..………….. 1     2     3     4     5 
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People of all nationalities living in North Korea..…………….1     2     3     4     5 
  
People of your nationality living anywhere in the world……..1     2     3     4     5 
  
People of all nationalities living anywhere in the world……...1     2     3     4     5 
 
1. What best identifies the ethnic Korean homeland: (rank in order of 1-6, 1 being the most 
representative and 6 being the least) 
_____ Territory controlled during the Three Kingdoms Period 
_____ Territory controlled by Unified Silla 
_____ Territory controlled during the Koryo dynasty 
_____ Territory controlled during the Joseon dynasty 
_____ Territory controlled currently by South Korea only 
_____ Territory controlled currently by both North and South Korea 
_____ Other (specify): ________________________________________________________ 
 
2. What do you consider your homeland? (multiple answers possible) 
 a) place of birth 
b) country of current residence 
c) land of forefathers 
d) historical homeland (please specify:___________________ ) 
e) Earth 
f) difficult to say 
 
3. Who should be considered native or indigenous residents of your country of current residence? 
(multiple answers possible) 
 a) only the ethnic majority 
 b) all belonging to ethnic majority regardless of place of birth 
c) all belonging to ethnic majority regardless of country of residence 
d) all born in the country 
e) we do not have to define this category 
f) all citizens are indigenous residents 
g) difficult to say 
 
4. Do you feel yourself to be a citizen of your country of current residence? 
 a) yes  
b) no 
c) difficult to say 
 
5. What is your primary community of belonging? (multiple answers possible) 
a) own ethnicity 
b) own residential community 
c) own family 
d) own profession 
e) own religious group 
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f) difficult to say 
g) other (please specify: ______________ ) 
 
6. Should South Korea render economic support its diaspora community and their host-countries? 
 a) yes 
b) no 
c) have not considered it 
d) don’t know 
f) difficult to say 
 
7. I can envision myself living in some other place 
 a) yes 
b) unsure 
c) no 
 
8. Have you considered migrating from your current county of residence? 
 a) no 
b) yes, but not seriously 
c) yes 
 
      *If so, to where: _______________________ 
 
9. If I had the possibility to leave my current country of residence I would… 
 a) definitely leave 
b) consider leaving 
c) stay 
 
      *If so, to where: _______________________ 
 
10. What would be a qualifying factor in selecting a new country in which to live? (multiple 
answers possible) 
 a) economic opportunities 
 b) prominent ethnic community (please specify: ____________ ) 
 c) ethnic/historic homeland 
 d) multi-cultural/multi-national 
 e) Other (please specify: ________________________ ) 
